Squeezing Public Schools’ Lemons: Theorizing an Adequacy Challenge to Teacher Tenure by Szeremeta, Peter M.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 73 | Issue 3 Article 16
Summer 6-1-2016
Squeezing Public Schools’ Lemons: Theorizing an
Adequacy Challenge to Teacher Tenure
Peter M. Szeremeta
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Education Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter M. Szeremeta, Squeezing Public Schools’ Lemons: Theorizing an Adequacy Challenge to Teacher




Squeezing Public Schools’ Lemons: 
Theorizing an Adequacy Challenge to 
Teacher Tenure 
Peter M. Szeremeta∗ 
Table of Contents 
 I. Introduction ................................................................... 1602 
 II. The History of School Finance Litigation ..................... 1609 
  A. Stage One: Federal Equal Protection Claims ......... 1611 
  B. Stage Two: State Equal Protection Claims ............. 1614 
  C. Stage Three: Hybrid Adequacy Claims ................... 1617 
 III: Vergara and the System of Teacher Tenure  
  in California ................................................................... 1621 
  A. Permanence Provision ............................................. 1624 
  B. Dismissal Provisions ............................................... 1625 
  C. Last-In, First-Out .................................................... 1629 
 IV. The Legal Arguments of Vergara .................................. 1630 
  A. Education as a Fundamental Right ........................ 1632 
  B. The Disparate Impact of the Tenure Provisions ..... 1635 
   1. Evidence of Discriminatory Effect ..................... 1635 
   2. Legal Theory of Disparate Impact ..................... 1638 
                                                                                                     
 ∗ J.D. Candidate May 2017, Washington and Lee University School of 
Law. I would like to thank my family for their unwavering support and editorial 
insights on this Note. I would further like to thank Professor Hu for her counsel 
on the constitutional law questions presented in this Note. I would also like to 
thank the following educators: Dwight Ho-Sang, Claudine Miles, Nate Snyder, 
Margaret Dantzler, and Vivian Pyles. These stellar instructors greatly informed 
my own experience as a teacher and showed me firsthand the power that an 
educator can have on the trajectory of a young person’s life. Lastly, I would like 
to dedicate this Note to my mother, Caroline Szeremeta, who was always my 
dearest advisor and my most profound role model. 
1602 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1601 (2016) 
 V. Framing the Ideal Legal Challenge to Teacher 
   Tenure ............................................................................ 1641 
  A. Demonstrating Causation ....................................... 1642 
  B. Equality or Adequacy: Which Legal Theory? .......... 1647 
 VI. Conclusion ...................................................................... 1652 
I. Introduction 
Tupac Shakur once analogized the urban minority student to 
a rose growing in concrete.1 As applied to education, the roses 
represent successful, college-educated members of society. The 
U.S. public education system’s objective is to produce as many 
roses as possible, despite the inevitability that not all students will 
blossom into roses.2  
This is where the concrete factors in. While all schools aim to 
produce as many roses as possible, the growing conditions in many 
schools more closely resemble concrete than fertile garden soil.3 
Concrete-like conditions embody deficiencies in many areas 
deemed necessary for student educational achievement, such as 
school funding, technological resources, and teacher quality.4 
The contrast between concrete schools and garden schools 
forms a symbolic backdrop for the widening of the achievement gap 
in the United States. The “achievement gap” refers to the growing 
disparity between the educational experiences of white and 
minority students.5 Despite increased integration in the decades 
                                                                                                     
 1. See TUPAC SHAKUR, THE ROSE THAT GREW FROM CONCRETE 3 (2009) 
(reciting the difficulties that minority children face).   
 2. See Overview and Mission Statement, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/landing.jhtml (last visited Sept. 30, 2016) (stating that 
the Department of Education’s mission is to “promote student achievement and 
preparation for global competitiveness by fostering educational excellence and 
ensuring equal access”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 3. See Jeff M.R. Duncan-Andrade, Note to Educators: Hope Required When 
Growing Roses in Concrete, 79 HARV. EDUC. REV. 181, 181–94 (2009) (noting the 
difficulty of growing young people in “concrete”). 
 4. See id. (explaining that “the quality of our teaching, along with the 
resources and networks we connect our students to” are the cracks in the concrete 
that allow students to grow). 
 5. See Catherine E. Lhamon, “Dear Colleague” Letter, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. OFF. 
OF C.R. 3–4 (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/ 
colleague-resourcecomp-201410.pdf (describing on average the many differences 
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following Brown v. Board of Education,6 recent studies indicate 
that re-segregation has steadily become the norm in public schools 
since the 1980s.7 In nearly every significant category of academic 
achievement, black and Latino students lag behind their white 
counterparts.8 This holds true for elementary and middle school 
standardized test scores,9 SAT scores,10 and high school 
graduation rates.11 
From Brown to the present day, the achievement gap has 
prompted students to pursue legal challenges to educational 
inequality under the umbrella of equal protection.12 Most 
                                                                                                     
between white and black students, from percentage of students enrolled in AP 
classes, to quality educational facilities). 
 6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 7. See ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH 
SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE DREAM? 31 (2003) (finding that “over 
70% of black students attend predominantly minority schools,” defined as schools 
with 50–100% minority student populations); see also Nikole Hannah-Jones, 
School Districts Still Face Fights—and Confusion—on Integration, ATLANTIC 
(May 2, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2014/ 05/lack-of-
order-the-erosion-of-a-once-great-force-for-integration/361563/ (last visited Sept. 
30, 2016) (stating that over 300 school districts are still under active 
desegregation orders) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 8. See Kevin Brown, The Supreme Court’s Role in the Growing School 
Choice Movement, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 37, 41 (2006) (noting that black and Latino 
students predominantly attend “minority, low-income, urban schools”).  
 9. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 2015-018, SCHOOL COMPOSITION AND THE 
BLACK-WHITE ACHIEVEMENT GAP 3 (2015), https://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/ 
subject/studies/pdf/school_composition_and_the_bw_achievement_gap_2015.pdf 
(referencing the results of the National Assessment of Educational Progress 
(NAEP) Grade 8 mathematics test, in which black students scored, on average, 
thirty-one points lower than white students did). 
 10. See THE COLLEGE BD., SAT PERCENTILE RANKS FOR 2013 COLLEGE-BOUND 
SENIORS 1 (2013), http://media.collegeboard.com/digitalServices/pdf 
/research/SAT-Percentile-Ranks-By-Gender-Ethnicity-2013.pdf (finding that, 
among SAT test-takers in 2013, the mean cumulative score of an African-
American student was 1278, compared to the mean score of 1576 for a white 
student). 
 11. See Gary Orfield et al., Losing Our Future: How Minority Youths Are 
Being Left Behind by the Graduation Rate Crisis, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, 
https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/school-
dropouts/losing-our-future-how-minority-youth-are-being-left-behind-by-the-
graduation-rate-crisis/orfield-losing-our-future-2004.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 
2016) (presenting national high school graduation rates from 2001 that list the 
graduation rates for Blacks and Hispanics at 50.2% and 53.2%, respectively, 
compared to 74.9% for White) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 12. See John Dayton & Anne Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who’s 
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challenges have centered on quantitative disparities between 
concrete and garden schools, such as unequal levels of funding.13 
Quantitative school-funding challenges are an obvious starting 
point for legal challenges to educational inequality. One can 
measure a district’s amount of per-pupil funding and easily 
identify district-wide funding disparities.14 These challenges allege 
the following syllogism: greater funding leads to greater resources; 
greater resources result in superior educational opportunities; 
therefore more funding necessarily leads to greater educational 
outcomes.15 Notwithstanding the importance of adequate funding, 
education achievement statistics in states that have won funding 
challenges suggest that money might not be the variable best 
suited to transform the concrete into a rose garden.16  
Recent studies indicate that teacher effectiveness is the most 
significant determining factor behind a student’s quality of 
education.17 This growing recognition of the importance of teacher 
                                                                                                     
Winning the War?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2351, 2358 (2004) (asserting that Brown 
sparked the “modern revolution in school funding equity”).  
 13. See id. at 2354 (noting that after the California Supreme Court struck 
down unequal school funding in Serrano v. Priest, most states have experienced 
similar forms of school funding litigation). 
 14. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1973) 
(comparing the per-pupil funding of San Antonio school districts while also 
factoring in those districts’ racial makeup).  
 15. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971) 
(asserting that funding disparities are directly responsible for the wide gap in 
quality of educational opportunities).  
 16. See infra note 17 and accompanying text (citing studies which describe 
the immense value of effective teaching).  
 17. See, e.g., Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman & Jonah E. Rockoff, Measuring 
the Impacts of Teachers II: Teacher Value-Added and Student Outcomes in 
Adulthood, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 2633, 2675 (2011) (using value-added analysis to 
determine that an ineffective teacher decreases the lifetime earning capacity of a 
single classroom by $1.4 million); Thomas J. Kane, Andrew Bacher-Hicks & 
Douglas O. Staiger, Validating Teacher Effect Estimates Using Changes in 
Teacher Assignments in Los Angeles 12–13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 20657, 2014) (finding substantially higher levels of student 
achievement with teachers in the seventy-fifth percentile); Steven G. Rivkin, 
Teachers, Schools, and Academic Achievement, 73 ECONOMETRICA 417, 419 (2005) 
(“The results reveal large differences among teachers in their impacts on 
achievement and show that high quality instruction throughout primary school 
could substantially offset disadvantages associated with low socioeconomic 
background.”). 
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effectiveness prompted the lawsuit in Vergara v. California.18 In 
Vergara, nine student plaintiffs argued that their quality of 
education was so poor that it violated their equal protection rights 
under the California constitution.19 Instead of challenging funding, 
the Vergara plaintiffs attacked California’s teacher tenure 
statutes, alleging that these laws operated to secure permanent 
employment for grossly ineffective teachers.20 While 
acknowledging that the problem of strict teacher tenure affects 
students statewide, the Vergara complaint also alleged that the 
tenure laws’ deleterious effects are most acute in schools serving 
predominantly minority students.21  
In an unprecedented decision, Judge Rolf Treu invalidated 
California’s teacher tenure statutes.22 The decision predictably 
received instant rebuke from teacher unions,23 but high-profile 
education figures like former U.S. Secretary of Education Arne 
Duncan lauded Vergara’s implications.24 Judge Treu relied on 
                                                                                                     
 18. See Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *3–4 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014) (recognizing the “growing body of research” that 
recognizes teacher quality as the paramount factor in student development). 
 19. See Jennifer Medina, Judge Rejects Teacher Tenure for California, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/us/california-teacher-
tenure-laws-ruled-unconstitutional.html?_r=0 (last visited Sept. 30, 2016) 
(providing background information on the Vergara plaintiffs) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 20. See Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, 
Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415 [hereinafter Vergara 
Complaint] (asserting that the tenure statutes force school administrators to act 
without their students’ best interests in mind when making employment and 
dismissal decisions). 
 21. See id. (claiming that tenure statutes “make the quality of education 
provided to school-age children in California a function of race . . . in violation of 
the equal protection provisions of the California Constitution”).  
 22. See Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *7 (finding that each tenure statute 
could not meet strict scrutiny).  
 23. See Issues and Action: Vergara v. State of California, CAL. TCHRS. ASS’N, 
http://www.cta.org/Vergara (last visited Sept. 30, 2016) (asserting that the 
Vergara complaint focused on the “wrong problems” and that Judge Treu’s 
holding circumvented the legislative process) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 24. See Press Release, Arne Duncan, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., Statement from U.S. 
Secretary of Education Arne Duncan Regarding the Decision in Vergara v. 
California (June 10, 2014) http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/statement-us-
secretary-education-arne-duncan-regarding-decision-vergara-v-califo (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2016) (“This decision presents an opportunity . . . to build a new 
framework for the teaching profession that protects students’ rights to equal 
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precedent from the Supreme Court of California to find that the 
California constitution provides each student with the 
fundamental right to an equal education.25 Reviewing each tenure 
provision under strict scrutiny, Judge Treu found that the 
government interest behind each tenure provision was not 
sufficiently compelling to withstand constitutional challenge.26 
Judge Treu also found that schools with predominantly 
minority populations employ the greatest number of grossly 
ineffective teachers.27 By referencing this disproportionate burden 
on minority students, Judge Treu seemed to indicate that the 
tenure laws could have also been struck down on a disparate 
impact theory.28 Because the tenure laws do not explicitly 
discriminate against minority students, plaintiffs would need to 
prove that the tenure laws nonetheless impose a discriminatory 
effect on minority students.29 While the parties to Vergara dispute 
the applicable standard for disparate impact, under either 
interpretation plaintiffs would have to show that California’s 
grossly ineffective teachers are disproportionately staffed in 
predominantly minority schools. 30  
The Vergara ruling—though only a trial court decision—
captured national attention because of its potential to open a new 
era of education litigation.31 While previous lawsuits focused on 
                                                                                                     
educational opportunities.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 25. See Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *3 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014) (claiming that the California constitution is the 
“ultimate guarantor of a meaningful, basically equal educational opportunity”). 
 26. See id. at *5 (finding that the defense could not even present a “legally 
cognizable reason” to support the Permanent Employment Statute). 
 27. See id. at *7 (finding that, because minority children disproportionately 
attend the low-income, low-performing schools in which grossly ineffective 
teachers are largely staffed, “minority children bear the brunt of staffing 
inequalities”).  
 28. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (describing laws 
imposing disparate impact as those which are not intended to discriminate but 
that nonetheless bear disproportionately adverse effects on minorities). 
 29. See id. at 586 (finding evidence of statistical disparities in the pass rate 
of the firefighter’s captain exam in New Haven, Connecticut).  
 30. See id. (interpreting those statistical disparities as evidence of adverse 
racial impact because the pass rate for whites on a firefighter’s captain exam was 
nearly double that of minority candidates). 
 31. See Joshua Lewis, ‘Vergara’ Decision Signals the Start of a Third Wave 
of Education Reform, WASH. POST (Aug. 14, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/vergara-decision-signals-the-start-of-
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school inputs such as funding, Vergara challenged teacher 
effectiveness—a qualitative factor managed and apportioned 
within the schoolhouse gates.32  
Recently, the California Court of Appeal overturned Judge 
Treu’s ruling and the Supreme Court of California denied 
plaintiffs’ petition for review.33 The appellate court found that 
Judge Treu skipped a crucial threshold step in his equal protection 
analysis: determining whether plaintiffs outlined a sufficiently 
“identifiable class of persons” to sustain an equal protection 
challenge.34 In the appellate court’s view, the subset of individuals 
harmed by grossly ineffective teachers changed each year, such 
that the only defining characteristic between these students was 
that they all once had the misfortune of sharing a classroom with 
a poor teacher.35 While the Vergara plaintiffs petitioned the 
Supreme Court of California for review, in August 2016 the court 
denied review by a 4–3 vote.36  
Given Vergara’s initial success, and subsequent reversal on 
appeal, this Note examines the question of whether similar teacher 
tenure challenges are viable in other states. If so, does an equal 
protection argument like that employed in Vergara represent the 
strongest formulation for a tenure challenge? Or should plaintiffs 
employ adequacy theory and base their challenges to ineffective 
teaching on the state’s constitutional obligation to provide an 
adequate level of education?  
                                                                                                     
a-third-wave-of-education-reform/2014/08/14/4abe128a-1f28-114-ae54-cfe1f974f8 
a_story.html?utm_term=.a5ec72e842b7 (last visited Sept. 30, 2016) (discussing 
the ramifications of the Vergara ruling) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 32. See id. (proclaiming that Vergara “makes it acutely clear that placing 
such a teacher in front of every child is the single greatest responsibility of our 
education system”).   
 33. See Vergara v. State, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 262 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).  
 34. Id. at 284–85.  
 35. See id. at 284 (noting that to claim an equal protection violation, “group 
members must have some pertinent common characteristic” other than shared 
violation of a fundamental right).  
 36. See Emma Brown, California Supreme Court Decision Leaves State’s 
Teacher Tenure Law in Place, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2016/08/22/california-supreme-
court-decision-leaves-states-teacher-tenure-law-in-place/ (last visited Sept. 30, 
2016) (describing the decision to deny review) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
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Answering these questions first requires examining the 
history of school funding litigation within the United States, 
including the California precedent upon which Judge Treu relied 
on in Vergara. Part II analyzes the three stages of educational 
reform litigation. It introduces the equal-protection based 
“equality” arguments of Stages One and Two. Additionally, Part II 
discusses the evolution of Stage Three “adequacy” arguments, 
which derive their cause of action from the text of state 
constitutional education clauses.  
Part III explores the background of the Vergara suit. Part III 
also analyzes the evidentiary foundation behind the principal 
theory of Vergara, which at its most general formulation is that 
tenure laws burden the educational opportunities of students. To 
do this, Part III dissects each specific tenure provision challenged 
in Vergara.  
Part IV presents Vergara’s legal arguments. Vergara cites 
both the California constitution’s Equal Protection Clause and its 
education clause to make dual equal protection arguments. First, 
Part IV analyzes the claim in Vergara that the tenure provisions 
burden students’ fundamental right to education. Second, Part IV 
assesses the independent equal protection claim that the tenure 
provisions disproportionately burdened low-income and minority 
students. To assess the viability of a disparate impact claim to 
teacher tenure, Part IV weighs both the evidence of discriminatory 
effect, as well as whether this proof is legally sufficient.  
Part V builds on Vergara and the history of school funding 
litigation to formulate the ideal legal theory for future teacher 
tenure challenges. First, Part V argues that tenure challenges will 
be more successful if brought under state constitutional provisions. 
Part V then grapples with the chief criticism of Vergara—that 
tenure challenges are flawed because of an evidentiary lack of 
causation. Critics of Vergara claim that the evidence cited by Judge 
Treu does not prove that teacher tenure laws are responsible for 
ineffective teachers in the classroom.37 Part V contends that 
because of the qualitative nature of teacher effectiveness, the 
Vergara plaintiffs met their burden of proof to show causation. 
Finally, Part V recommends that plaintiffs adopt adequacy theory 
                                                                                                     
 37. See infra note 275 and accompanying text (criticizing Judge Treu for 
summarily accepting plaintiffs’ evidence of causation).  
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for future teacher tenure challenges. As evidenced by the recent 
reversal of Vergara on appeal, and the subsequent denial of review 
by the Supreme Court of California, equality arguments have 
several weaknesses that will prevent them from becoming 
consistently successful in other states.38  
II. The History of School Finance Litigation 
Most education reform litigation aimed at bridging the 
achievement gap has targeted public school funding systems.39 
While states retain ultimate authority for funding public schools, 
most states have delegated this responsibility to local 
governments.40 At the local level, funding formulas are often based 
on property tax revenue.41 This type of funding formula inevitably 
creates large disparities between property-wealthy and property-
poor districts.42 To legally challenge these disparities, plaintiffs 
have alleged a direct link between disparities in funding and 
disparities in the “quality and extent” of educational 
opportunities.43 Metaphorically, this argument holds that funding 
inequalities are what prevent concrete from developing into rose 
gardens.  
Commentators generally divide the history of school reform 
litigation into three stages.44 The first stage immediately followed 
                                                                                                     
 38. See infra note 275 and accompanying text (analyzing the weaknesses of 
equality challenges to teacher tenure).  
 39. See Dayton & Dupre, supra note 12, at 2353–54 (noting that, after the 
California Supreme Court struck down unequal school funding in Serrano v. 
Priest, most states have experienced similar forms of school-funding litigation). 
 40. See id. at 2355–57 (describing the basis for school funding disputes).  
 41. See id. (noting how local governments implement property taxes to 
supplement any school funding granted by the state).  
 42. See Quentin A. Palfrey, The State Judiciary’s Role in Fulfilling Brown’s 
Promise, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 8 (2002) (noting that in Arizona, for example, 
disparities in “assessed valuation per pupil between the wealthiest and the 
poorest districts . . . are greater than 7,000 to 1”). 
 43. See Serrano I, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971) (alleging that the funding 
in plaintiffs’ school district is substantially inferior to the funding available to 
many other districts in California).  
 44. See, e.g., William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of 
School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 
597, 600–04 (1994) [hereinafter The Third Wave] (establishing a three-wave 
temporal framework for education reform litigation); Peter Enrich, Leaving 
1610 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1601 (2016) 
the Court’s historic ruling in Brown v. Board of Education.45 
During this first stage, plaintiffs initiated school-funding 
arguments grounded in the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection 
Clause.46 First-stage arguments continued until 1973, when the 
Court refused to classify education as a fundamental right in San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.47 Moving to new 
legal ground, plaintiffs initiated a second stage of litigation by 
bringing similar equal protection arguments under state 
constitutional equal protection clauses.48 While some school-
funding challenges succeeded in the second stage,49 most states 
followed Rodriguez and refused to recognize education as a 
fundamental right under their own equal protection clauses.50  
The third stage of school funding litigation has shifted away 
from the equality arguments of the first two stages.51 In the third 
                                                                                                     
Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 
104 (1995) (same). 
 45. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 46. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).  
 47. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).  
 48. See The Third Wave, supra note 44, at 601–03 (discussing the cases that 
characterized the second wave).  
 49. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 953 (Cal. 1976) 
(noting that the equal protection provisions of the California constitution possess 
an “independent vitality” in recognizing education as a fundamental right, 
notwithstanding Rodriguez); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 297–98 (N.J. 1973) 
(finding that reliance on local taxation produced educational disparities that 
clearly fell short of the New Jersey constitutional mandate of “thorough and 
efficient schools”); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374–75 (Conn. 1977) 
(invalidating a property tax funding scheme that abridged students’ fundamental 
right to education); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979) (same).  
 50. See, e.g., Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360, 367 (Pa. 1979) (rejecting the 
contention that the Pennsylvania constitutional mandate of “thorough and 
efficient” schools required uniformity of funding); Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., 
Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1151 (Okla. 1987) (refusing to classify education as 
a fundamental right); Hornbeck v. Somerset Cty. Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 789–
90 (Md. 1983) (expressing concern that the recognition of education as a 
fundamental right would force the court to recognize several other important 
state-provided services as “fundamental”); Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 
359, 369 (N.Y. 1982) (stating that the importance of education as a state 
governmental concern does not inherently implicate fundamental right 
classification).  
 51. See The Third Wave, supra note 44, at 603–05 (observing that plaintiffs 
within the third stage focused on “differences in quality of education delivered, 
rather than on the resources available to the districts”). 
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stage, plaintiffs base their claims on state constitution education 
clauses.52 These claims do not focus on attaining equality of 
expenditures for all schools.53 Rather, the “adequacy” arguments 
in the third stage allege that learning conditions within a school 
do not meet the minimum standard of quality guaranteed in the 
education clause.54  
A. Stage One: Federal Equal Protection Claims 
Plaintiffs hoping to equalize disparities in school conditions 
believed that Brown provided them with a textual basis for 
contending that education was a fundamental right under the U.S. 
Constitution.55 After all, Brown declared education to be “perhaps 
the most important function of state and local governments” and a 
right “which must be made available to all on equal terms.”56 If 
these plaintiffs could cast education as a fundamental right, they 
then could challenge school funding laws under strict scrutiny, a 
heightened standard of review that most funding statutes could 
not meet.57 In Serrano I,58 the Supreme Court of California 
accepted education as a fundamental right and became the first 
                                                                                                     
 52. See id. at 603 (discussing the third-stage reliance on state equal 
protection clauses).  
 53. See id. (limiting the importance of comparing financial resources on a 
school-by-school basis).  
 54. See id. (stating that quality is no longer measured in financial terms, but 
rather by the actual caliber of education provided). To illustrate the contrast 
between minimum standards established in state education clauses, compare 
N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and 
support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state 
may be educated.”), with CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“A general diffusion of 
knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and 
liberties of the people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the 
promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral and agricultural improvement.”).  
 55. See Enrich, supra note 44, at 116 (referring to the language of Brown as 
an “invitation to pursue this clearly stated right to equal educational opportunity 
into settings other than segregation”).  
 56. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).  
 57. See Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State 
Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325, 1331–35 (1992) (evaluating the 
differences between reviewing a claim under strict scrutiny and the more 
deferential rational basis test).  
 58. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I) 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).  
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court to invalidate school funding under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.59  
Before Serrano I, extensive disparities in per-pupil funding 
existed among California’s public school districts.60 For example, 
in California from 1968 to 1969, the per-pupil funding in the 
property-poor district of Baldwin Park was $577.49, as compared 
to the $1,231.72 expended per student in the property-wealthy 
Beverly Hills district.61 The Serrano I plaintiffs alleged that these 
funding disparities resulted in substantial educational 
inequalities.62 The Supreme Court of California, seizing upon the 
promising language in Brown, declared education to be a 
fundamental interest and applied the resulting strict scrutiny 
standard to the school-funding system.63 The court found that the 
funding laws invidiously discriminated against the poor and, as 
such, could not withstand constitutional challenge under the Equal 
Protection Clause.64  
Serrano I sparked copycat suits in several states, many of 
which similarly struck down school-funding laws.65 But, with 
Rodriguez in 1973, the Supreme Court effectively negated any 
education funding argument that alleged a violation of the federal 
Equal Protection Clause.66 The facts of Rodriguez are very similar 
to those of Serrano I in that Rodriguez concerned gross disparities 
                                                                                                     
 59. See id. at 1244 (finding that California’s funding scheme “invidiously” 
discriminates against the poor, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 60. See id. (noting that the heavy dependence on property taxes created 
“resultant wide disparities in school revenue”). 
 61. See id. at 1248 (comparing per-pupil funding across several California 
school districts).  
 62. See id. at 1244 (noting that certain school districts receive substantially 
less funding per pupil due to much smaller property tax bases).  
 63. See id. at 1255–57 (emphasizing the “indispensable role” that education 
plays in modern society).  
 64. See id. at 1244 (finding that California’s funding scheme violated the 
equal protection clause of both the U.S. Constitution and California constitution). 
 65. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187, 217 (N.J. 1972) (citing Serrano 
I in declaring education a fundamental right that must be made available to all 
on equal terms); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 877 (D. Minn. 1971) 
(analogizing the Minnesota funding scheme to California’s and finding the 
Serrano I court’s reasoning to be “completely persuasive”).  
 66. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 15–17 (1973) 
(“It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in 
the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.”).  
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within Texas’s public school funding scheme.67 The Court 
reaffirmed Brown and recognized the significance of education, but 
noted that the appropriate inquiry for determining a fundamental 
right is not the importance of a given service.68 Finding no explicit 
or implicit constitutional basis for classifying education as a 
fundamental right, the Court applied the weaker rational basis 
test and upheld Texas’s funding scheme.69 
Rodriguez further recognized an important limitation of 
equality-based challenges.70 The Court noted the lack of “logical 
limitations” if it were to hold that the Equal Protection Clause 
guaranteed an equal right to education—mainly, that the 
argument could be expanded to demand equal funding and 
resources with respect to other state-provided services.71 The 
defense in Serrano I raised a similar argument, contending that 
recognition of equal education under the Equal Protection Clause 
would mandate similar state protections to “all tax-supported 
public services.”72 The Rodriguez Court further cautioned against 
the potential ramifications of invalidating local property taxes as 
a permissible means of funding education.73 If property taxes 
                                                                                                     
 67. See id. (describing the difference in per-pupil spending between the 
lesser affluent Edgewood District ($356 per student) and the more affluent Alamo 
Heights District ($594 per student)).  
 68. See id. at 30 (noting the “historic dedication to public education,” yet 
rejecting the notion that the Court could grant fundamental rights classification 
based on the importance of a State-provided service).   
 69. See id. at 35 (rejecting the argument that the Constitution impliedly 
guarantees education because education is a fundamental pre-requisite to other 
constitutionally guaranteed rights, such as the right to vote and the right to 
exercise First Amendment freedoms).  
 70. See id. at 37 (noting that even if education was a fundamental right, the 
relative differences in spending levels would not constitute interference with a 
fundamental right for equal protection purposes).  
 71. See id. (questioning how it would be possible to distinguish education 
from other “significant personal interests in the basics of decent food and 
shelter”). 
 72. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1262 (Cal. 1971) 
(rejecting defense counsel’s argument that this would “spell the destruction of 
local government” and finding that education retains a certain “uniqueness 
among public activities”). 
 73. See Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. 1, 54 (1973) 
(contending that it has never been within the Court’s purview to invalidate 
“statewide measures for financing public services merely because the burdens or 
benefits fall unevenly depending upon the relative wealth of the political 
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create unconstitutional inequalities in education, then it might 
also be just as impermissible in the context of other locally 
provided services, such as public utility facilities and public 
hospitals.74 These concerns continued to trouble state courts as 
plaintiffs brought equality arguments under state equal protection 
clauses in the second stage.75 
B. Stage Two: State Equal Protection Claims 
The Rodriguez Court concluded that education is “not among 
the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal 
Constitution,”76 notably omitting that all state constitution’s 
guarantee the right to education.77 The Court further stated that 
reforms to state taxation and education were matters best reserved 
for state legislatures.78 Following this cue, post-Rodriguez 
education reform litigation shifted to equality arguments based on 
state constitutions’ equal protection clauses.79 Many plaintiffs 
buttressed their equal protection claim by arguing that state 
education clauses also provided the textual basis to regard 
education as a fundamental right.80  
                                                                                                     
subdivisions in which citizens live”).  
 74. See id. at 58 (reserving the right to reform state taxation and education 
to state legislative bodies).  
 75. See, e.g., Hornbeck v. Somerset Cty. Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 785 (Md. 
1983) (noting that “police, fire, welfare, health care and other social services” are 
equally as fundamental as education); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 283 (N.J. 
1973) (hesitating to decide a school funding challenge on New Jersey’s Equal 
Protection Clause because of the potential obligation to then sustain other 
challenges to other state-provided services).  
 76. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. 
 77. See Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance 
Reform Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 311 (1991) (observing that each 
state’s education clause “generally requires the state legislature to establish some 
system of free public schools”).  
 78. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 58 (asserting that solutions to funding 
disparities in schools must ultimately “come from the lawmakers and from the 
democratic pressures of those who elect them”).  
 79. See The Third Wave, supra note 44, at 601–03 (describing the mixed 
success of plaintiffs in the second stage). 
 80. See Joseph S. Patt, School Finance Battles: Survey Says? It’s All Just a 
Change in Attitudes, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 547, 559–61 (1999) (describing 
the methodology of legal arguments within the second stage).  
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Despite this stronger textual basis, plaintiffs experienced only 
mixed success in the second stage.81 In light of the Rodriguez 
ruling, Serrano came back to the Supreme Court of California in 
1976 for renewed consideration.82 The Supreme Court of California 
recognized that Rodriguez “undercut” the ruling of Serrano I, but 
only to the extent that Serrano I held that the funding statutes 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.83 In Serrano II,84 the 
California Supreme Court acknowledged the sameness of the state 
and federal equal protection clauses, but found that the state 
clause possessed “an independent vitality” that demanded a 
separate analysis.85 As such, the holding of Rodriguez had no 
bearing on the Supreme Court of California’s decision to interpret 
its state constitutional provisions as recognizing education as a 
fundamental interest.86  
In large part, state courts faced with funding challenges 
adopted the Supreme Court’s conceptual framework for analyzing 
federal equal protection claims.87 As in Serrano II—when a state 
court interpreted its own constitution as recognizing education as 
a fundamental right—state courts applied strict scrutiny and 
invalidated school funding laws.88 If a state court found that 
                                                                                                     
 81. See Robert M. Jensen, Advancing Education Through Education Clauses 
of State Constitutions, 1997 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 1, 10–11 (arguing that equality 
arguments are, “at best, only a semi-successful method of . . . advancement of 
education” and that most equality arguments in the second stage “continued in 
the unsuccessful ruts of Rodriguez”). 
 82.  See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 930–31 (Cal. 1976) 
(discussing the holding of Serrano I and the subsequent enactment of legislative 
changes to California’s education funding scheme).  
 83. See id. at 949 (explaining that the holding of Serrano I depended on both 
the U.S. Constitution and the California constitution).  
 84. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II) 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976). 
 85. See id. at 950 (noting that U.S. Supreme Court decisions defining 
fundamental rights “are to be followed by California courts only when they 
provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by California law”); see 
also Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 371 (Conn. 1977) (discussing the 
implications of Rodriguez while fully recognizing the “independent vitality” of the 
provisions of the Connecticut constitution).  
 86. See Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 950–51 (adhering to the ruling of Serrano I 
under the California constitution).  
 87. See Palfrey, supra note 42, at 17 (finding that state courts largely 
mirrored the requirements for strict scrutiny that applied in federal equal 
protection cases).  
 88. See, e.g., Horton, 376 A.2d at 373–74 (interpreting the state 
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education was not a fundamental right, then the state could argue 
for rational basis review.89 Under rational basis, the state usually 
contended that local control over schools satisfied a legitimate 
government objective.90 Applying the rational basis test generally 
resulted in the court upholding a school-funding statute.91  
Despite initial success in cases like Serrano II, most state 
courts began to rule against equality arguments as the second 
stage progressed.92 In assessing the potential for challenges to 
teacher tenure, it is necessary to consider why equality arguments 
faltered as recourse for those seeking to improve educational 
conditions.93 State courts treated equality arguments with great 
trepidation, wary of their illusory simplicity.94 This wariness arose 
as courts attempted to identify the “appropriate dimension for 
comparison” in remedying unequal education.95 Many might 
                                                                                                     
constitutional provision for the right to education to be so “basic and 
fundamental” that any law burdening education should be subject to strict 
scrutiny); Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo. 
1980) (same). 
 89. See Palfrey, supra note 42, at 17 (observing that, where education was 
not treated as a fundamental right, a state only had to demonstrate that the 
funding scheme was rationally related to a legitimate state objective).  
 90. See id. (remarking that courts usually found local control to be a 
legitimate state objective).  
 91. But cf. Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 154 (Tenn. 
1993) (rejecting the premise that local control was rationally related to the school 
funding scheme).  
 92. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 366 (N.Y. 1982) 
(following Rodriguez’s reasoning by noting that the high priority of education does 
not automatically trigger strict scrutiny); Lujan v. Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 
1017–18 (Colo. 1982) (noting that, despite the guarantee in the Colorado 
constitution of a “thorough and uniform system of free public schools,” 
fundamental rights are not solely defined through an implicit or explicit textual 
basis); Britt v. N.C. State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432, 436 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) 
(confining constitutional language mandating “equal opportunities . . . for all 
students” to issues of racial segregation); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 
168 (Ga. 1981) (finding that the Georgia education system met the minimum 
standards promised by the Georgia constitution); Hornbeck v. Bd. of Educ., 458 
A.2d 758, 786 (Md. 1983) (concluding that education is not a fundamental right 
for equal protection purposes under the Maryland constitution).  
 93. See Enrich, supra note 44, at 144 (discussing the many inadequacies of 
equality arguments). 
 94.  See id. (noting that most presume that the simplicity of an equality 
argument is one of its greatest strengths).  
 95. Id. at 145.  
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presume that in a challenge to unequal school funding, the obvious 
metric for determining equality would be funding.96 Yet, the evidence 
concerning the correlative relationship between school funding and 
quality of education is hazy at best.97 For example, states in which 
education litigants have won funding challenges, like California and 
New Jersey,98 continue to have similar disparities in white-black 
student achievement as states, such as New York and Ohio,99 where 
litigants have been unsuccessful.100  
C. Stage Three: Hybrid Adequacy Claims 
While the U.S. Constitution does not contain any express 
provision guaranteeing the right to education,101 almost every state 
constitution has an education clause that, at minimum, directs the 
state legislature to maintain a free system of public schools.102 With 
the advent of the third stage in 1989,103 school-funding litigants 
began to depend on the textual mandate of these state 
                                                                                                     
 96. See id. at 147 (explaining that actual funding provided to schools “retains 
the virtue of easy quantification”).  
 97. See id. at 154–55 (arguing that the substantial progress some states have 
made in equalizing school budgets “has proven insufficient to put the educational 
opportunities of disadvantaged children on a par with those of their better-off 
peers”).  
 98. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1265 (Cal. 1971) 
(invalidating the “constitutionally defective” financing scheme); Robinson v. 
Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 298 (N.J. 1973) (same).  
 99. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 366–67 (N.Y. 1982) 
(finding that preserving local control of education to be a legitimate state 
interest); Bd. of Educ. v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 824 (Ohio 1979) (same).  
 100. See ALAN VANNEMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NCES 2009-455, 
ACHIEVEMENT GAPS: HOW BLACK AND WHITE STUDENTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
PERFORM IN MATHEMATICS AND READING ON THE NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF 
EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS 21 fig. 11 (2009) (giving each state’s black-white 
achievement gap a score, in which higher scores represent wider gaps). California 
and New Jersey each scored a thirty-five, whereas New York and Ohio scored 
thirty-two and thirty-three, respectively. Id.  
 101. See McUsic, supra note 77, at 312 (noting the theoretical difficulties state 
courts face when interpreting rights that are guaranteed in both the state and 
federal constitutions).  
 102. See id. at 311 (discussing the slight variations among textual guarantees 
amongst state education clauses). 
 103. See The Third Wave, supra note 44, at 603 (stating that the third wave 
began with plaintiffs’ victories in Kentucky, Montana, and Texas).  
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constitutional education clauses.104 Instead of alleging that 
unequal funding amounted to a violation under the state equal 
protection clause, third-stage plaintiffs contended that increased 
funding was necessary to ensure that the quality of education in 
their district met the adequacy standard set out in the education 
clause.105  
This profound strategy shift provided several significant 
advantages over the equality-based arguments of the first and 
second stages.106 Most notably, education clauses provide an 
unambiguous textual basis to address deficiencies in public 
schools.107 Courts addressing school-funding challenges can 
measure the facts of the case against the mandate of the education 
clause.108 Furthermore, reliance on equal protection clauses in the 
second stage forced courts to grapple with federalism concerns and 
the potential for spillover challenges to other state-provided 
services.109 The third stage’s new focus on education clauses 
alleviated these concerns because education clauses are singularly 
targeted at education.110  
 Adequacy arguments under education clauses are also more 
conducive to judicial intervention.111 Second-stage equality 
                                                                                                     
 104. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Ky. 1989) 
(restating plaintiffs’ argument that the funding scheme was inadequate under 
Kentucky’s education clause).  
 105. See The Third Wave, supra note 44, at 603 (noting that, in third-stage 
suits, school systems are struck down not because of financial inequalities, but 
because of disparities in the quality of education).  
 106. See Enrich, supra note 44, at 166 (extolling the virtues of adequacy 
arguments). 
 107. See id. (noting the convenience this textual basis provides to third-stage 
litigants, as education clauses are plainly addressed to the status of public 
schools). 
 108. See id. (explaining that third-stage arguments are “addressed to a single, 
specific sphere of governmental responsibility”). 
 109. See McUsic, supra note 77, at 314 (claiming that the slippery slope 
created by equal protection arguments hampered plaintiffs’ success in the second 
stage). 
 110. See The Third Wave, supra note 44, at 603 (noting that the use of 
education clauses under the third stage has fewer implications for other areas of 
law than would a decision grounded in either state or federal equal protection 
clauses). 
 111. See Enrich, supra note 44, at 167 (explaining that courts are more prone 
to accept adequacy arguments because of the universal importance society places 
on education).  
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arguments evoked leveling concerns—the fear that, by comparing 
one district’s resources to another, an underfunded district could 
only be improved at the expense of nearby wealthier districts.112 In 
contrast, adequacy arguments do not engage in comparative fact-
finding and only seek to enforce the constitutional standard of 
educational adequacy.113  
When addressing a third-stage argument, a court must first 
decide if the suit is an adequacy suit or an equality suit.114 In many 
third-stage cases, plaintiffs consolidate challenges to both the state 
education clause and the state equal protection clause into the 
same action.115 Equality suits, presented on their own, require an 
equal protection analysis similar to that of the first and second 
stages.116 When presented in conjunction with an adequacy 
argument, however, the two arguments are often mutually 
reinforcing.117  
Courts must also define the specific obligations imposed on the 
state based on the clause’s specific language.118 Each state utilizes 
different diction and phrasing in its education clause, resulting in 
education quality standards that vary by state.119 Some education 
                                                                                                     
 112. See id. at 168 (referring to such comparative analysis as a zero-sum 
game). 
 113. See Palfrey, supra note 42, at 21 (noting that, under the third wave, a 
very low-performing school district could engender a claim despite having 
relatively high per-pupil expenditures). 
 114. See The Third Wave, supra note 44, at 608–09 (claiming that all third 
wave cases to date have been quality suits).  
 115. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Ky. 
1989) (detailing plaintiff’s complaint that the unequal funding scheme violated 
the guarantee of an efficient system of schools, as well as the guarantee of equal 
protection of the laws); Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 691 
(Mont. 1989) (declining to address plaintiff’s equal protection claim after finding 
the funding scheme unconstitutional under Montana’s education clause).  
 116. See The Third Wave, supra note 44, at 605 (claiming that the equal 
protection analysis will often be dominated by the determination of whether the 
state court holds education to be a fundamental right).  
 117. See Enrich, supra note 44, at 107 (discussing how the presence of the 
education clause allows state courts to justify determining that the state equal 
protection clause provides for greater educational rights than the federal Equal 
Protection Clause).  
 118. See The Third Wave, supra note 44, at 610 (describing the obligation to 
determine the specific quality standard set forth in an education clause).  
 119. See William E. Thro, The Role of Language of the State Education 
Clauses in School Finance Litigation, 79 EDUC. L. REP. 19, 23 (1993) [hereinafter 
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clauses require the minimum, exemplified by New York’s 
constitutional directive to “provide for the maintenance and 
support of a system of free common schools.”120 In contrast, some 
state education clauses assert heightened standards of quality, as 
evidenced by Georgia’s constitutional mandate that “the provision 
of an adequate public education for the citizens shall be a primary 
obligation of the State.”121  
Professor Ratner’s proposed classification model generally 
separates states into four categories based on the strength of the 
language in the education clause.122 States in the Category One, 
like New York, have education clauses that oblige the legislature 
to provide for free public schools but provide no additional 
standard of quality.123 Category Two education clauses add a 
quality standard.124 The Category Two quality standard generally 
                                                                                                     
The Role of Language] (suggesting that language can be the determinative factor 
in predicting whether a state court will regard education to be a fundamental 
right).  
 120. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
 121. GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.  
 122. See Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: 
Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 814–17 (1985) 
(differentiating each grouping of states by their respective commitments to 
education).  
 123. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art XIV, § 256 (imposing a general legislative duty 
to “establish, organize, and maintain a . . . system of public schools”); ALASKA 
CONST. art. VII, § 1 (same); HAW. CONST. art IX, § 1 (same); KAN. CONST. art. VI, 
§ 1 (same); LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (same); N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (same); NEB. 
CONST. art. VII, § 1 (same); N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (same); S.C. CONST. art. XI, 
§ 3; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (same); UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1 (same); VT. CONST. 
ch 2, § 68 (same); CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (same); MASS. CONST. ch. 5, § 2 
(same); N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (providing further that “equal opportunities shall 
be provided for all students”); TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12 (recognizing further the 
“inherent value of education”). 
 124. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art XIV, § 1 (providing for an “efficient system of 
public schools”); OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 3 (same); PA. CONST. art. III, § 14 (same); 
MD. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (same); DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (same); KY. CONST. § 183 
(same); MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (same); TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (same); W. 
VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (same); COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (providing for a “uniform 
system of free public schools”); ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (same); IDAHO CONST. art. 
IX, § 1 (same); WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3 (same); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; (same); 
OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (same); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1 (stating that “it is the 
goal . . . to establish a system of education which will develop the full educational 
potential of each person”); VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (imposing a legislative duty to 
“ensure that an educational program of high quality is established and 
continually maintained”).   
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requires that the system of public schools be either “efficient” or 
“thorough.”125 Category Three clauses provide even stronger 
quality standards and often establish specific purposes for the 
establishment of common schools.126 The strongest education 
clauses belong to Category Four. These clauses describe education 
as a “paramount” or “fundamental” duty of the state.127 
Looking to the future viability of tenure challenges, what may 
be more important than the text of a state’s education clause is 
how a state court interpreted that clause during a previous funding 
challenge.128 Plaintiffs can advance equal protection challenges to 
tenure with greater confidence in states that have previously 
recognized education to be a fundamental right.  
III. Vergara and the System of Teacher Tenure in California 
In May 2012, Beatriz Vergara and eight other California 
students challenged the constitutionality of five teacher tenure 
provisions in California’s Education Code.129 The lawsuit alleged 
                                                                                                     
 125. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 
1989) (finding that Kentucky’s school funding scheme violated the education 
clause mandate for an “efficient system of common schools”); Abbott v. Burke, 575 
A.2d 359, 367 (N.J. 1990) (describing the New Jersey legislature’s “absolute” 
obligation to provide a “thorough and efficient” educational system).  
 126. See, e.g., IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (stating that knowledge and learning 
are “essential to the preservation of a free government” and that “it shall be a 
duty of the General Assembly to encourage . . . moral, intellectual, scientific, and 
agricultural improvement”); IOWA CONST. art. IX, § 2 (same); NEV. CONST. art. XI, 
§ 2 (same); R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (same); S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (same); WYO. 
CONST. art. VII, § 1 (same); CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (same); MICH. CONST. art. VIII, 
§ 2 (same); MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) (same).  
 127. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (stating that “provision of an adequate 
public education . . . shall be a primary obligation”); ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 
(providing that “a fundamental goal . . . is the educational development of all 
persons”); ME. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 83 (stating that it is 
the “duty of the legislators . . . to cherish the interest of literature and the 
sciences”); WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (mandating that it is the “paramount duty of 
the state to make ample provision for the education of all children”); FLA. CONST. 
art. IX, § 1 (same). 
 128. See Enrich, supra note 44, at 185 (summarizing the outcomes of funding 
challenges in over thirty-five different states).  
 129. See Vergara Complaint, supra note 20, at 3 n.1 (listing the challenged 
statutes). The challenged provisions are California Education Code § 44929.21, 
subdivision (b), § 44934, § 44938, subdivisions (b)(1) and (2), § 44944, and 
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that California’s teacher tenure system acted to ensure permanent 
employment of grossly ineffective teachers.130 The complaint 
further alleged that these grossly ineffective teachers 
substantially impair students’ quality of education throughout 
California.131 To fully understand the Vergara suit, it is imperative 
to consider what exactly plaintiffs meant by a “grossly ineffective” 
teacher. The common perception of an ineffective teacher is one 
who monotonously lectures, who is not well versed in his or her 
content area, or who does not have mastery of teaching 
techniques.132 This common interpretation, however, did not 
encompass the type of teacher challenged in the suit.133  
Beatriz Vergara testified at trial of a former teacher who 
derisively called her a “cholo”134 and who told other Latino 
students that they would end up cleaning houses for a living.135 On 
the more passive side of the grossly ineffective spectrum, student 
plaintiffs from other California schools testified of teachers who 
                                                                                                     
§ 44955.  
 130. See id. (asserting that the challenged statutes preclude school 
administrators from considering the best interests of their students in making 
teacher personnel decisions).  
 131. See id. at 4 (claiming that the negative impact of grossly ineffective 
teachers infringes upon California students’ fundamental right to education).  
 132. See Bruce Torff & David N. Sessions, Principals’ Perceptions of the 
Causes of Teacher Ineffectiveness, 97 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 530, 530 (2005) (noting 
that the “capacities of teaching expertise have been broadly categorized 
as . . . content knowledge and pedagogical knowledge”).  
 133. See Vergara Complaint, supra note 20, at 10 (defining a grossly 
ineffective teacher as one in the bottom 5% of all educators); see also Respondents’ 
Brief at 2, Vergara v. State, No. B258589 (Cal Ct. App. June 24, 2015) [hereinafter 
Respondents’ Brief] (referring to grossly ineffective teachers as those who cannot, 
or will not teach). 
 134. See Cholo, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/cholo (last visited Sept. 30, 2016) (defining “cholo” as 
disparaging term used for a boy of Mexican descent, or for a Mexican-American 
youth belonging to a street gang) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 135. See Mark Harris, Vergara Sisters Recall Teachers Who Inspired Them to 
Join Lawsuit, L.A. SCH. REP. (Feb. 11, 2014, 6:01 PM), 
http://laschoolreport.com/vergara-sisters-recall-teachers-who-inspired-them-to-
join-lawsuit/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2016) (noting further Ms. Vergara’s testimony 
as to her eighth grade science teacher) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). Ms. Vergara testified as to her eighth grade science teacher, “I was 
scared to ask her questions because she would insult me. She always made fun of 
students, calling one girl a stick figure and whore.” Id.  
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slept in class, who neglected teaching duties to do crossword 
puzzles, and who permitted students to smoke marijuana.136 The 
persistent use of the descriptor “grossly ineffective” represents a 
significant tactical move for the plaintiffs. By employing “grossly 
ineffective” as a term of art, the plaintiffs attempted to create a 
concrete and specific subset of teachers that became the target of 
the lawsuit.137 These grossly ineffective teachers had ironclad job 
security under California law, despite their poor job performance 
allegedly “destroy[ing] students’ educational opportunities.”138 
The trouble with the phrase “educational opportunities,” 
however, is that it is an abstraction. Few would deny that bad 
teachers have detrimental effects on their students—yet, the 
question is what exactly do these effects amount to, and what 
specific opportunities do they foreclose?139 Historically it has been 
difficult to quantify effective teaching and to predict the specific 
costs that a grossly ineffective teacher imposes on his or her 
students.140 This explains why the Vergara plaintiffs sought to 
portray teacher effectiveness as a variable that can be 
measured.141  
Instead of making an abstract claim that an ineffective 
teacher causes slower reading growth or less proficiency with 
multiplication, the Vergara plaintiffs cited to studies that 
quantified the precise impact of a grossly ineffective teacher.142 For 
                                                                                                     
 136. See id. (describing plaintiffs’ testimony at trial).  
 137. See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 133, at 23 n.6 (responding to 
appellants’ contention that the trial court never defined “grossly ineffective” by 
claiming that even appellants’ own witnesses used the phrase and agreed that a 
grossly ineffective teacher “is someone whose students consistently fail to learn 
the academic materials”). 
 138. Vergara Complaint, supra note 20, at 18.  
 139. See 2 Eric A. Hanushek & Steven G. Rivkin, Teacher Quality, in 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 1052, 1065–66 (2006) (framing the 
field of study that examines teacher quality by focusing on “outcome-based 
measures of teacher effectiveness”).  
 140. See id. at 1066 (reviewing studies of outcome-based measures of teacher 
effectiveness and concluding that there are several difficulties that “must be 
overcome in order to estimate the variation of overall teacher effects”).  
 141. See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 133, at 19–20 (asserting that 
plaintiffs’ evidence “went far beyond the basic and indisputable premise that 
teachers matter,” and that plaintiffs proved that “teacher effectiveness . . . can be 
assessed and measured”).  
 142. See id. (presenting “voluminous evidence” of the ability to quantify 
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example, Dr. Raj Chetty testified at trial to a finding in his study 
that “replacing a teacher whose current VA . . . is in the bottom 5 
percent with an average teacher would increase the mean present 
value of students’ lifetime income by $250,000 per classroom over 
a teacher’s career.”143 Dr. Kane, the head researcher behind the 
Measures of Effective Teaching (MET) Project, similarly testified 
that students in the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) 
who have a “bottom 5% teacher for a single year lose between nine 
and twelve months of learning.”144 These statistics demonstrate 
the first link of the Vergara argument, which is that grossly 
ineffective teachers harm students.145 To form the second link—
that tenure provisions employ and retain grossly ineffective 
teachers—it is crucial to understand how each tenure provision 
operates.146  
A. Permanence Provision 
Under Section 44929.21(b) of the California Education Code, 
probationary teachers are granted “permanent employee” status 
after having been employed for two consecutive school years.147 
The provision also mandates that school administrators inform 
teachers whether they have received permanent status by March 
15 of their second year.148 This creates a probationary period of 
                                                                                                     
teacher effectiveness).  
 143. See Chetty, supra note 17, at 2635 (concluding that “good teachers create 
substantial economic value and that test score impacts are helpful in identifying 
such teachers”). VA, or value-added, refers to the impact teachers make on their 
student’s test scores. Id.  
 144. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 133, at 21–22.  
 145. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (emphasizing the need to 
show the specific harms of ineffective teaching).  
 146. See infra Part III.A–C (discussing how the tenure provisions work 
individually and collectively to secure the employment of grossly ineffective 
teachers).  
 147. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44949.21(b) (2015) (“Every employee of a school 
district . . . who, after having been employed by the district for two complete 
consecutive school years . . . shall, at the commencement of the succeeding school 
year be classified as and become a permanent employee of the district.”).  
 148. See id. (noting also that in the event that the school board neglects to 
give the teacher notice regarding his or her permanent status, the teacher will 
nonetheless be deemed reelected for the next school year).  
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only sixteen months, a low figure that even includes the summer 
months when school is not in session.149  
The Vergara plaintiffs alleged that this brief probationary 
period does not give school administrators the necessary time to 
evaluate a teacher’s skill level.150 Numerous principals testified at 
trial that two years is insufficient to make a well-informed 
judgment of a teacher’s ability.151 A study by the National Council 
on Teacher Quality found that, in California, the brief 
probationary period renders a teacher’s effectiveness to be a 
“nominal” consideration in the evaluation and tenure review 
process.152 Additionally, this brief period creates an awkward 
timing scenario in which many teachers receive permanent 
tenured status before fully completing their two-year certification 
program.153 As a result, thousands of teachers receive permanent 
status in California that may have been otherwise rejected had the 
probationary period been even one year longer.154  
B. Dismissal Provisions 
Once a teacher receives permanent status, that teacher can 
only be dismissed for one of the causes enumerated in Section 
                                                                                                     
 149. See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 133, at 25 (noting that this sixteen 
month period is insufficient to make well-informed tenure decisions).  
 150. See id. at 26 (referencing the limited amount of “classroom evaluation 
data, student and parent input, and student achievement data that can be 
collected over such a short period”).  
 151. See id. (citing former LAUSD Superintendent John Deasy, who testified 
at trial that “there is no way that 16 months is a sufficient amount of time”).  
 152. NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, TEACHER QUALITY ROADMAP: 
IMPROVING POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN LAUSD 33–34 (2010), 
http://www.nctq.org/p/publications/nctq_lausd.pdf (showing that 97% of 
nontenured teachers received satisfactory evaluations in 2009–2010, which is 
essentially the same figure as the percentage of tenured teachers who receiving 
satisfactory ratings).  
 153. See CALIF. DEP’T OF EDUC., GREATNESS BY DESIGN: SUPPORTING 
OUTSTANDING TEACHING TO SUSTAIN A GOLDEN STATE 43 (2012) [hereinafter 
Greatness by Design], http://www.cde.ca.gov/eo/in/documents/greatnessfinal.pdf 
(framing the conflicts posed by the current timeline for granting tenure in 
California). 
 154. See id. (“The net result is that ineffective and grossly ineffective teachers 
earn tenure every year in California, even though a longer probationary period 
would alleviate the problem.”).  
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44932.155 Among the potential causes for dismissal are egregious 
misconduct, immoral conduct, and unsatisfactory performance.156 
To an outsider, it would appear that administrators could readily 
dismiss grossly ineffective teachers on the grounds of 
unsatisfactory performance.157 Further reading of the statutory 
scheme, however, reveals the complex web of procedures to 
navigate before a teacher can be dismissed due to unsatisfactory 
performance.158  
First, Section 44938(b) prevents the school district from filing 
charges of unsatisfactory performance unless the teacher has 
received written notice of the charges.159 This written notice must 
specify the exact nature of the teacher’s unsatisfactory 
performance, including a description of “specific instances of 
behavior” with “such particularity as to furnish the employee an 
opportunity to correct his or her faults and overcome the grounds 
for the charge.”160 The practical effect of the particularity 
requirement is that administrators must often spend months 
detailing specific events that evince a teacher’s unsatisfactory 
performance.161 
Once written notice has been given, a teacher has up to ninety 
days to try and remedy the factual basis for the charges of 
unsatisfactory performance.162 Further, the ninety-day 
                                                                                                     
 155. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44932 (2015) (listing the only causes for which a 
permanent employee may be dismissed).  
 156. See id. (citing other grounds for dismissal, including conviction of a 
felony, dishonesty, or persistent refusal to obey state school laws).  
 157. See Beth Barrett, LAUSD’s Dance of the Lemons, L.A. WEEKLY (Feb. 11, 
2010), http://www.laweekly.com/news/lausds-dance-of-the-lemons-2163764 (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2016) (describing a first-grade teacher in LAUSD who received 
three notices of unsatisfactory performance before ultimately accepting an 
$80,000 settlement payment to leave) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 158. See infra notes 159–175 and accompanying text (navigating the statutory 
requirements for dismissing a teacher).  
 159. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44938(b)(1) (2015) (requiring also that the written 
notice include an evaluation pursuant to § 44660). 
 160. Id.  
 161. See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 133, at 11 (noting testimony at trial 
which asserted that extensive evidence of a teacher’s incompetence is required, or 
“else there is virtually no possibility that the teacher’s dismissal will be upheld”).  
 162. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44938(b)(1) (2015) (allowing the employee the 
opportunity to “overcome the grounds for the charge”).  
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remediation period applies to all dismissal proceedings for 
unsatisfactory performance—the law does not provide the school 
board with the latitude to determine that a given teacher is 
incapable of remediation.163 If, after this ninety-day period, the 
school board decides to continue with its initial decision to 
terminate, the board may issue formal charges of unsatisfactory 
performance.164 Similar to the initial notice, the charges 
themselves must “specify instances of behavior,” “state the 
statutes and rules the employee is alleged to have violated,” and 
“set forth the facts relevant to each charge.”165 After receiving 
these formal charges, a teacher has an additional thirty days to 
decide whether to request a hearing.166 If the teacher does request 
a hearing, the hearing must occur within six months of the 
request.167  
The hearing’s procedural requirements also afford substantial 
safeguards for teachers.168 Section 44944.05 provides several 
discovery requirements, including disclosure of witness names and 
witness statements, as well as disclosure of relevant documents 
and tangible items.169 Presiding over the hearing is a Commission 
on Professional Competence (CPC).170 Both the school board and 
the teacher each get to select one member to the CPC, who serve 
along with an independently appointed Administrative Law 
                                                                                                     
 163. See id. § 44938(c) (2015) (distinguishing unsatisfactory performance 
from unsatisfactory conduct).  
 164. See id. § 44934(b) (2015) (providing that a majority vote of the school 
district’s governing board should precede the filing of charges).  
 165. Id. § 44934(c) (2015). 
 166. See id. § 44934(b) (2015) (adding that suspension proceedings under 
§ 44934(b) may only be initiated if the school district’s governing board has not 
adopted a collective bargaining agreement).  
 167. See id. § 44944(b)(1)(A) (2015) (providing that only extraordinary 
circumstances as determined by an administrative law judge will justify a 
continuance for a hearing date beyond six months of the employee’s initial 
request).  
 168. See, e.g., id. § 44944(c)(2) (allowing the employee to select one member of 
the three-person review panel that renders the final decision).  
 169. See id. § 44944.05(A) (2015) (mandating discovery disclosures “within 45 
days of the date of the employee’s demand for a hearing”).  
 170. See id. § 44944(c)(1) (2015) (granting the parties the alternative option 
to waive their right to a CPC hearing and instead conduct a single hearing with 
an administrative law judge).  
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Judge.171 After the hearing, the CPC must render a final written 
decision that contains findings of fact, determinations of the issues, 
and a final disposition.172 If the CPC decides to dismiss the teacher, 
then the costs are split between the school district and the state.173 
However, if the CPC decides against dismissal, then the school 
district bears the entire cost of the proceeding.174 As a final 
safeguard, any teacher dismissed after a CPC hearing has the 
right to appeal to California Superior Court.175  
To summarize, administrators wishing to fire a teacher for 
unsatisfactory performance must navigate the following steps: 
(1) compile months of particularized evidence of unsatisfactory 
performance; (2) give the teacher notice of findings; (3) allow the 
teacher ninety days to remedy performance; (4) issue formal 
charges declaring the intention to dismiss the teacher; (5) allow 
the teacher thirty days to request a hearing; (6) if the teacher 
requests the hearing, schedule the hearing within six months of 
the request; and (7) ensure that the school district has the 
requisite funds to pay for at least half of the hearing’s cost.176 As 
to cost, former Los Angeles School Superintendent John Deasy 
estimated at the Vergara trial that it can cost anywhere “between 
$250,000 and $450,000” to dismiss a tenured teacher for 
unsatisfactory performance.177 School administrators wanting to 
                                                                                                     
 171. See id. § 44944(c)(2) (2015) (noting that the administrative law judge is 
the chairperson of the committee).   
 172. See id. § 44944(d)(1) (2015) (declaring that the CPC must rule for either 
outright dismissal, suspension without pay, or that neither dismissal nor 
suspension is necessary).  
 173. See id. § 44944(f)(1) (2015) (noting that this cost includes the cost of the 
administrative law judge).  
 174. See id. § 44944(f)(2) (2015) (including payment for “travel, meals, and 
lodging” for committee members, as well as “reasonable attorney’s fees incurred 
by the employee”).  
 175. See id. § 44945 (2015) (providing that this appeal can be petitioned for 
by either the employee or the school district governing board).  
 176. See supra notes 159–175 and accompanying text (detailing the step-by-
step process for firing a teacher due to unsatisfactory performance).  
 177. See Frederick M. Hess, No Shortcut to School Reform, U.S.A. TODAY 
(June 11, 2014, 4:44 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/06/11/ 
school-reform-vergara-california-teacher-tenure-column/10321765/ (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2016) (observing that teacher tenure laws “pre-date the advent of equal 
employment laws or modern hiring practices”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
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fire a grossly ineffective teacher will often neglect to pursue this 
laborious and costly dismissal process and will either deal with the 
teacher, or more commonly, attempt to facilitate that teacher’s 
transfer to another school.178 
C. Last-In, First-Out 
California law permits layoffs of permanent employees due to 
various conditions, including lower student enrollment, 
curriculum modifications, and budgetary constraints.179 California 
law further directs the evaluation criteria that administrators 
must adhere to when deciding which teachers to layoff.180 Section 
44955(b) states in pertinent part that “the services of no 
permanent employee may be terminated under the provisions of 
this section while any probationary employee, or any other 
employee with less seniority, is retained to render a service which 
said permanent employee is certificated and competent to 
render.”181 Known colloquially as “Last-In, First-Out” (LIFO), this 
system of seniority-based layoffs protects senior teachers 
regardless of actual teaching ability.182 The Vergara plaintiffs 
alleged that this “model of irrationality” forces school 
administrators to make personnel decisions without taking into 
account the students’ best interests.183  
Seniority-based layoffs have at least two specific harmful 
effects on students. First, senior teachers command higher salaries 
than junior teachers.184 When seniority-based layoffs occur due to 
                                                                                                     
 178. See Barrett, supra note 157 (citing evidence that LAUSD has paid thirty-
two tenured teachers more than $1.5 million to leave the district).  
 179. See CAL EDUC. CODE § 44955(b) (2015) (noting that the school district 
governing board has the authority to initiate layoffs).  
 180. See id. (providing that “the governing board shall determine the order of 
termination solely on the basis of needs of the district”).  
 181. Id.  
 182. See Greatness by Design, supra note 153, at 14 (fearing the “extensive 
layoffs of excellent teachers who may be lost to the profession if they cannot soon 
return”).  
 183. See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 133, at 39 (describing the testimony 
at trial of a young teacher who won a “Teacher of the Year” award, but was 
nevertheless fired the same year due to the seniority-based layoff scheme).  
 184. See LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCH. DISTRICT, 2015–2016 SALARIES FOR 
TEACHERS WITH REGULAR CREDENTIALS (2015), http://achieve.lausd.net/cms/lib08/ 
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budget shortfalls, this means that a school must dismiss a greater 
number of junior teachers to compensate for this deficit.185 Within 
the school, the practical effect of this is that class sizes increase, 
which hampers students’ educational experience.186 The Vergara 
plaintiffs focused heavily on the second harmful effect of LIFO: the 
consequences of excluding teacher effectiveness from the criteria 
driving the layoff process.187 Often, LIFO provisions force the firing 
of younger and more effective teachers, while at the same time 
safeguarding the employment of grossly ineffective teachers who 
have seniority.188 As with each of the statutes, the plaintiffs 
claimed that the harms that the LIFO provision imposed are 
significant and quantifiable.189  
IV. The Legal Arguments of Vergara 
Analyzing Vergara’s legal argument reveals several 
similarities to the primary legal argument behind many school-
funding challenges.190 Challenges to teacher tenure and to unequal 
                                                                                                     
CA01000043/Centricity/Domain/280/Salary%20Tables/T%20Annual%20Table_1-
6.pdf (listing the salary scale for teachers in Los Angeles).  
 185. See DANA GOLDHABER & RODDY THEOBALD, CENTER FOR EDUC. DATA & 
RES., MANAGING THE TEACHER WORKFORCE IN AUSTERE TIMES: THE IMPLICATIONS 
OF TEACHER LAYOFFS 6 (2010), http://www.cedr.us/papers/working/CEDR% 
20WP%202011-1.2%20Teacher%20Layoffs%20(6-15-2011).pdf (discussing the 
implications of seniority-based layoffs).  
 186. See Sam Dillon, Tight Budgets Mean Squeeze in Classroom, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/07/education/07classrooms.html 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2016) (noting the correlative link between budgetary 
constraints and increased class sizes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 187. See Vergara Complaint, supra note 20, at 17 (alleging that students 
suffer when high-performing junior teachers are dismissed in favor of low-
performing senior teachers).  
 188. See id. (noting that the LIFO statute also hinders recruitment of new 
teachers because it creates the culture in which schools can fire new teachers 
regardless of performance).  
 189. See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 133, at 39 (citing a study which found 
“84 percent of teachers laid off under a seniority-based system are more effective 
than all the teachers who would be laid off under an effectiveness-based layoff 
system”).  
 190. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 952 (Cal. 1976) 
(concluding that the California school financing system negatively affects 
students’ fundamental right to education); Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 
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school funding both seek to redress the inferior quality of education 
in underachieving schools.191 Just as school-funding cases 
challenged the constitutionality of property tax formulas, Vergara 
challenged the constitutionality of teacher tenure provisions.192 
The meaningful difference between the two is that Vergara 
substituted teacher ineffectiveness for money as the variable most 
responsible for the inadequate education that many students 
receive.193  
The core legal claim of Vergara is that the tenure provisions 
violated California’s Equal Protection Clause.194 Because the 
plaintiffs based their claim in the state equal protection clause, 
and not its federal counterpart, the challenge to tenure in Vergara 
is most analogous to a second-stage funding challenge.195 
Structurally, the equal protection claim in Vergara has two 
independent pillars. First, the plaintiffs alleged that the tenure 
provisions unconstitutionally burden the fundamental right to 
equal educational opportunity, as guaranteed by the California 
constitution.196 Second, the plaintiffs argued that the tenure 
                                                                                                     
WL 6478415, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014) (finding that the challenged 
tenure provisions bear an appreciable burden on students’ fundamental right to 
education). 
 191. See The Third Wave, supra note 44, at 597–98 (discussing the 
motivations behind school financing challenges).  
 192. See Vergara Complaint, supra note 20, at 1 (alleging that the tenure 
provisions “perpetrate and widen the very achievement gap that education is 
supposed to eliminate”).  
 193. Compare Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 277 (N.J. 1973) (accepting the 
proposition that “the quality of educational opportunity does depend in 
substantial measure upon the number of dollars invested”), with Vergara v. State, 
No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *3–4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014) 
(claiming that effective teachers are a critical component to a student’s “in-school 
educational experience”).  
 194. See Vergara Complaint, supra note 20, at 5 (alleging that the tenure 
provisions create arbitrary and unjustifiable distinctions that prevent children of 
the same age and ability from receiving “substantially equal access to education”).  
 195. See Palfrey, supra note 42, at 16 (finding that the analytical scheme used 
in the state equal protection claims of the second stage largely resembles that of 
the federal equal protection cases in the first stage).  
 196. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) 
(“[W]here fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal 
Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be 
closely scrutinized and carefully confined.”). 
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provisions have a disparate impact on minority students.197 The 
alleged discriminatory effect of the tenure provisions is that the 
majority of grossly ineffective teachers work in underachieving 
schools that disproportionately serve minority populations.198 The 
plaintiffs contended that these two equal protection arguments, if 
proven either individually or collectively, merit strict scrutiny 
review.199  
A. Education as a Fundamental Right 
To contend that state action has burdened a fundamental 
right, plaintiffs must first establish that the right they are 
asserting is, in fact, fundamental.200 Fundamental rights are those 
guaranteed by constitutional text,201 or those that are so “deeply 
rooted” in history and tradition to be regarded as fundamental.202 
The Vergara plaintiffs relied on California precedent to prove that 
education is a fundamental right.203 From Serrano I all the way to 
Vergara, California courts have highly regarded the “fundamental 
importance of education.”204 California courts have further 
                                                                                                     
 197. See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 133, at 44 (alleging that the harms 
imposed by the tenure provisions “are magnified for the most vulnerable 
students—minority children . . . most in need of the opportunities that education 
is meant to provide”).  
 198. See id. at 46 (claiming that African-American and Latino students in Los 
Angeles “are 43% and 68% more likely, respectively, to be taught by teachers in 
the bottom 5% of effectiveness compared to white students”).  
 199. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 637 (1996) (stating that if a law 
“neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class” then the law 
will be upheld if it passes rational basis review).  
 200. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 670 (recognizing the right to vote as “too 
fundamental to be burdened or conditioned”).  
 201. See Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) 
(stating that fundamental rights are those “explicitly or implicitly provided” in 
the Constitution).  
 202. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (noting 
that fundamental rights are drawn from the “respect for the teachings of history 
(and), solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society” (quoting 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965))).  
 203. See Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *1–2 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014) (addressing the factual histories and the holdings of 
both Serrano and Butt). 
 204. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1258 (Cal. 1971) (“We 
are convinced that the distinctive and priceless function of education in our 
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interpreted the state’s education clause as imposing a stringent 
legislative duty to provide equal education.205 Judge Treu regarded 
the California courts’ consistent pro-education position to be firm 
evidence that the Supreme Court of California established 
education as a fundamental right within the state.206  
Once plaintiffs show that the challenged state law burdens the 
exercise of a fundamental right, the law can only meet strict 
scrutiny review if the state can demonstrate a “compelling state 
interest” justifying the law.207 This compelling state interest must 
also be “narrowly drawn” to be the least restrictive means 
possible.208 The Vergara opinion addresses each tenure provision 
individually, concluding in each instance that the provision has a 
negative and appreciable impact on educational quality.209 As to 
the permanent employment statute, Judge Treu accepted the 
evidence on the negative consequences of the brief probationary 
period.210 Judge Treu agreed that this brief period precluded an 
informed decision as to a teacher’s skill, and stated that he could 
not even find a “legally cognizable reason” behind the statute.211  
Reviewing the dismissal provisions, Judge Treu once again 
agreed with the plaintiffs’ argument, finding that the dismissal 
process was too costly and too complex to work efficiently.212 Judge 
Treu noted the estimate at trial that 1–3% of all teachers in 
                                                                                                     
society warrants, indeed compels, our treating it as a ‘fundamental interest.’”).  
 205. See Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1249 (Cal. 1992) (finding that this 
legislative duty accords California citizens greater rights against state-
maintained educational discrimination than does the U.S. Constitution).  
 206. See Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *3–4 (“In Serrano I and II and 
Butt, . . . an overarching theme is paradigmatized: the Constitution of California 
is the ultimate guarantor of a meaningful, basically equal educational 
opportunity being afforded to the students of this state.”). 
 207. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).  
 208. See id. (noting that courts striking down state laws on abortion have 
scrutinized the state’s purported interest in “protecting health and potential life”).  
 209. See Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *2 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014) (finding that plaintiffs “met their burden of proof on all 
issues presented”). 
 210. See id. at *5 (concluding that this brief period results in teachers “being 
reelected” who may have been refused permanent status had the probationary 
period been longer).   
 211. Id.  
 212. See id. at *6 (finding that the sophistication of the dismissal procedures 
rendered an “efficient, yet fair dismissal of a grossly ineffective teacher illusory”).  
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California are grossly ineffective.213 Considering the impracticality 
of the dismissal process, Judge Treu proclaimed that it “cannot be 
gainsaid that the number of grossly ineffective teacher has a 
direct, real, appreciable, and negative impact on a significant 
number of California students.”214 Finally, Judge Treu found that 
the LIFO provision poses a “lose-lose situation” for students, in 
that seniority-based layoffs often force students to miss out on the 
“junior/efficient teacher” while also leaving the senior/ineffective 
one in place.215 
After noting the burden imposed by each tenure provision, 
Judge Treu also addressed whether the State could put forth a 
compelling interest in advancing the tenure provisions.216 This 
analysis was very brief—at the outset of the opinion, Judge Treu 
noted that the cumulative effect of plaintiffs’ evidence was 
sufficient to “shock the conscience.”217 The dismissal provision 
garnered the most analysis regarding a potentially compelling 
state interest.218 The State contended that the procedural 
protections were necessary to afford teachers with due process.219 
Instead, Judge Treu found that the dismissal provision as 
constituted resembled “über due process.”220 Because the 
                                                                                                     
 213. See id. at *4 (comparing this percentage rate to the roughly 275,000 
active teachers in California and finding that this results in a numerical range of 
grossly ineffective teachers from 2,750 to 8,250).  
 214. See Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *4 (noting that this negative and 
appreciable impact extends well into the future for however long these teachers 
retain their employment).  
 215. See id. at *6–7 (observing that the LIFO provision does not contain a 
waiver or exception for those junior teachers that prove themselves to be 
effective).  
 216. See id. at *4 (adding that the State must also demonstrate that the 
distinctions drawn by the tenure statutes are “necessary to further their purpose” 
(quoting Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1249 (1971))).  
 217. See id. at *4 (adding that plaintiffs’ cumulative body of evidence was 
“compelling”).  
 218. See id. at *5–6 (responding to the “entirely legitimate issue of due 
process” raised by the State).  
 219. See Appellants’ Brief at 13, Vergara v. State, No. B258589 (Cal Ct. App. 
May 1, 2015) [hereinafter Appellants’ Brief] (referring to grossly ineffective 
teachers as those who cannot, or will not, teach). “The statutory dismissal process 
serves critical legislative purposes by ensuring that districts provide adequate 
procedural protections to tenured teachers facing dismissal, including protections 
required by due process.” Id.  
 220. See Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *5 (Cal. 
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procedural protections far exceeded what due process required, 
Judge Treu found that harm imposed on students by the dismissal 
statutes outweighed any state interest in added protections.221  
B. The Disparate Impact of the Tenure Provisions 
1. Evidence of Discriminatory Effect 
The other side to the Vergara plaintiffs’ equal protection claim 
was the allegation that the tenure provisions discriminated 
against low-income and minority students.222 An equal protection 
claim alleging discrimination often arises when a law draws 
distinctions based on a suspect classification, such as race or 
gender.223 There are generally two ways to establish a suspect 
classification. First, some laws explicitly draw impermissible 
distinctions between different groups of people.224 Second, even if 
a law is facially neutral, a court may invalidate that law if its effect 
is to discriminate unfairly against one or more suspect classes.225 
Given the facial neutrality of the tenure provisions, the Vergara 
plaintiffs employed the latter argument of effects-based 
discrimination.226  
                                                                                                     
Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014) (discussing the balancing test for procedural due process 
that applies to other California state employees).  
 221. See id. at *6 (expressing confidence that California courts are just as 
dedicated to protecting due process rights of teachers as they are to safeguarding 
the rights of students to equal educational opportunities).  
 222. See Vergara Complaint, supra note 20, at 1 (acknowledging that grossly 
ineffective teachers harm students statewide, but alleging that “the problem is 
worse” for students attending disproportionately minority and low-income 
schools).  
  223 See Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifications: On 
Discriminating, Unwittingly or Otherwise, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 937, 938 (1991) 
(noting that a suspect class is a group of individuals deserving of added 
protections because of a history of discrimination against that group).  
 224. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (striking down 
Virginia’s miscegenation statutes because they drew impermissible distinctions 
solely according to race). 
 225. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252, 264–65 (1977) (noting that for a statute to be invalidated on disparate impact 
grounds, plaintiffs must demonstrate proof of racially discriminatory intent or 
purpose).  
 226. See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 133, at 71 (citing to Serrano I, where 
the California Supreme Court invalidated the facially neutral school funding 
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Analyzing how the tenure provisions act in concert to 
disproportionately burden the educational opportunities of 
minorities is thus crucial to substantiating a disparate impact 
claim.227 The most influential mechanism through which the 
tenure provisions disadvantage minority students is through the 
“Dance of the Lemons.”228 A lemon is a grossly ineffective teacher 
who, because of the early award of tenure and the complexity and 
cost of the dismissal procedures, a school cannot reasonably fire.229 
Because dismissal is not a practical option, school administrators 
often transfer their lemons.230 Due to their ineffectiveness, these 
unwanted lemons dance from school to school, negatively affecting 
the educational growth of each classroom they land in.231 Each of 
the challenged tenure provisions in Vergara perpetuates a 
different stage of the lemon dance, and the cumulative effect is that 
most lemons end up teaching in low-income schools that serve 
predominantly minority populations.232  
                                                                                                     
statute because it had the effect of discriminating based on wealth). 
 227. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1250 (Cal. 1971) (noting 
the facial neutrality of the property tax formula but emphasizing the importance 
of considering the effects of the formula as “a practical matter”). 
 228. See Barrett, supra note 157 (describing the administrative tactics that 
keep the lemon dance churning, such as paying ineffective tenured teachers to 
leave or transferring these teachers to “unsuspecting schools”).  
 229. See id. (describing what type of teacher constitutes a “lemon” teacher). 
Barrett documents the story of Roque Burio, a former science teacher at San 
Pedro High School in LAUSD. Id. Burio was ineffective as a teacher—in his first 
four years teaching, he received five “below-standard” teaching evaluations. Id. 
Burio’s approach to the classroom was “inquiry-based” learning, which his 
principal translated to mean “teachers do not teach.” Id. The article cites one 
bizarre lab experiment in which Burio told students to document behavior of live 
animals, yet did not bring any animals to class for observation. Id. Instead, Burio 
told his students to look at pictures of animals in books and complete the 
assignment that way. Id. Burio’s principal spent six years attempting to train 
Burio, conducting weekly observations and providing him with personal mentors. 
Id. Ultimately unable to fire Burio, LAUSD paid him $50,000 to “quietly leave.” 
Id.   
 230. See id. (explaining that lemon teachers are either transferred or 
“repeatedly and fruitlessly” retained).  
 231. See id. (referencing the example of a teacher who was paid $40,000 to 
stop teaching in LAUSD, but who is still actively listed in LAUSD’s substitute 
teacher pool).  
 232. See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 133, at 99 (alleging that the lemon 
dance exacerbates “the achievement gap” and concentrates “teacher layoffs in 
schools serving high-need communities”).  
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The permanence and dismissal provisions also have the 
combined effect of producing lemons. The brief probationary period 
before awarding tenure increases the likelihood that more grossly 
ineffective teachers will receive permanent status.233 Faced with a 
lemon teacher, school administrators would much rather transfer 
that lemon than initiate an expensive, multi-year dismissal 
proceeding.234 A report from the California Department of 
Education (CDE) itself admits that this transfer mechanism is the 
most “practical course of action at the individual school level.”235  
The lemon dance’s discriminatory effects emerge when one 
looks at which schools have the majority of teacher vacancies. The 
CDE Report found that “poorly performing teachers generally are 
removed from higher-income or higher-performing schools and 
placed in low-income and low-performing schools,”236 adding that 
because “minority children disproportionately attend such schools, 
minority students bear the brunt of staffing inequities.”237 The 
lemon dance has downward movement—lemons can only be 
transferred to schools with vacancies, which statistically tend to be 
low-income schools with high minority populations.238 The Vergara 
plaintiffs alleged that, because the tenure provisions create and 
protect the lemons, the provisions bear responsibility for the 
discriminatory impact these lemons have on the educational 
quality of low-income and minority students.239 
The final piece to understanding the discriminatory impact of 
the lemon dance lies with the role of the LIFO provision. In 
                                                                                                     
 233. See Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *5 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014) (noting that California is only one of five states that has 
a probationary period of two years or less).  
 234. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (detailing the labyrinth of 
procedures administrators must navigate to dismiss a teacher for unsatisfactory 
performance).  
 235. See CALIF. DEP’T OF EDUC., EVALUATING PROGRESS TOWARD EQUITABLE 
DISTRIBUTION OF EFFECTIVE EDUCATORS 46 (2007) [hereinafter CDE REPORT] 
(finding that dismissal proceedings are rarely initiated due to the reluctance of 
administrators). 
 236. Id. at 46.  
 237. Id. at 5.   
 238. See id. at 46 (finding that nearly half of school administrators in 
LAUSD’s Western district admitted to trying to hide their openings to avoid 
hiring “excessed teachers”).  
 239. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (describing how the lemon 
dance disproportionately affects low-income and minority students).  
1638 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1601 (2016) 
California, the LIFO provision mandates that, in the event of 
layoffs, seniority determines which teachers retain their jobs.240 
Again, this would appear to affect all schools uniformly. Low-
income, minority schools, however, are the schools with the 
“highest concentration of teachers with the lowest seniority.”241 
The overall impact is that when layoffs occur, the LIFO provision 
ensures that the schools with the highest percentage of vacancies 
will be these low-income, underachieving schools.242 Two 
immediate consequences arise: (1) low-income, high-minority 
schools more commonly experience teacher turnover;243 and (2) the 
need created by these vacancies guarantees other lemons a place 
to teach.244  
2. Legal Theory of Disparate Impact 
Whether a disparate impact challenge to teacher tenure is 
successful largely depends on the applicable legal standard for 
proving disparate impact.245 In Vergara, the State advocated the 
Supreme Court’s position as set forth in Washington v. Davis,246 
which held that along with discriminatory effect, plaintiffs must 
also demonstrate a discriminatory motive or purpose behind the 
passage of the law.247 Discriminatory purpose obviously exists 
                                                                                                     
 240. See supra Part III.C (explaining the operation of the LIFO statute).  
 241. See Vergara Complaint, supra note 20, at 18 (citing the California 
Committee on Education Excellence, which found that the “State of California has 
created a pattern of disparities . . . that not only limits the opportunities for these 
students, but reinforces and enlarges the existing social inequalities confronting 
them”).  
 242. See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 133, at 49 (citing a study which 
analyzed actual teacher layoff data in LAUSD and found that “schools in the 
highest quartile of poverty are 65% more likely than other schools to have a 
teacher laid off under the LIFO Statute”).  
 243. See CDE REPORT, supra note 235, at 19 (noting the harmful effects that 
high teacher turnover has on school achievement).  
 244. See Barrett, supra note 157 (describing the cyclical nature of the Lemon 
Dance).  
 245. Compare Respondents’ Brief, supra note 133, at 96 (“California courts do 
not require a showing of discriminatory intent in the face of disparate impact.”), 
with Appellants’ Brief, supra note 219, at 66 (alleging that the discriminatory 
intent requirement “applies to claims under the California Constitution”).  
 246. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 247. See id. at 239 (describing the methods by which discriminatory purpose 
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when the law is facially discriminatory.248 The tenure provisions, 
however, are facially neutral—they speak solely to the issue of 
teacher employment and do not draw any ostensible 
classifications.249 The Supreme Court did not foreclose finding 
discriminatory purpose behind a facially neutral law.250 The Court 
instead imposed a high burden by requiring plaintiffs to show a 
clear racial pattern “unexplainable on grounds other than race.”251  
The Vergara plaintiffs contend that demonstrating the 
discriminatory impact of the tenure provisions is sufficient to 
render the provisions unconstitutional.252 Regardless of “whatever 
the federal rule might be,” the plaintiffs assert that a showing of 
disparate impact under California law does not require proof of 
discriminatory purpose.253 In Serrano II, the Supreme Court of 
California distinguished California’s equal protection provisions, 
noting that they “are possessed of an independent vitality.”254 The 
State cited to the Supreme Court of California’s decision in Hardy 
v. Stumpf255 to refute this argument.256 In Hardy, the results of a 
                                                                                                     
can be proven).  
 248. See supra note 224 and accompanying text (discussing how laws that 
facially distinguish between suspect classes automatically invoke heightened 
scrutiny).  
 249. See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 133, at 95 (conceding that the tenure 
provisions are facially neutral, but contending that strict scrutiny applies because 
of the disproportionate harmful effects imposed).  
 250. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
266–67 (1977) (finding that plaintiffs can show discriminatory purpose by looking 
to the historical background of the law, or to the administrative history behind 
the law).  
 251. See id. (observing that cases where such a pattern can be shown are 
“rare”).  
 252. See supra note 245 and accompanying text (citing plaintiffs’ argument 
that disparate impact does not require a showing of discriminatory purpose in 
California).   
 253. See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 133, at 96 (fortifying the claim by 
referencing the California Supreme Court’s guarantee in Serrano II that the 
California constitution demands an analysis independent of the federal 
standard).  
 254. See Serrano II, 557 P.2d 929, 950 (1976) (stating that this independent 
vitality exists despite the fact that the text of both equal protection clauses is 
substantially the same).  
 255. 21 Cal.3d 1 (Cal. 1978). 
 256. See Appellants’ Brief, supra note 219, at 66 (alleging that Hardy 
established a requirement of discriminatory purpose for disparate impact cases 
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physical agility test for police department applicants showed that 
a disproportionately greater percentage of men passed than 
women.257 In rejecting the plaintiff’s equal protection claim, the 
Supreme Court of California quoted Washington’s language that 
“standing alone, disproportionate impact does not trigger the rule 
that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest 
scrutiny.”258  
Butt v. State,259 decided after Hardy, provides further pivotal 
insight into the standard for disparate impact in California.260 The 
Vergara plaintiffs maintained that Butt is more dispositive than 
Hardy because Butt pertained to educational discrimination and 
was decided more recently.261 The Butt court first noted that the 
California constitution grants greater rights against educational 
discrimination than does federal law.262 Then, the court stated that 
“[d]espite contrary federal authority, California constitutional 
principles require State assistance to correct basic ‘interdistrict’ 
disparities in the system of common schools, even when the 
discriminatory effect was not produced by the purposeful conduct of 
the State or its agents.”263  
In the Vergara opinion, Judge Treu devoted very little analysis 
to the plaintiffs’ disparate impact argument. Judge Treu found 
that the evidence was “clear” that the tenure provisions had a 
disproportionate burden on low income and/or minority students, 
but made no mention of the potential requirement of a 
discriminatory purpose.264 In reversing Judge Treu, the California 
                                                                                                     
in California).  
 257. See Stumpf, 21 Cal.3d at 6 (noting that eighty-five percent of men passed 
the test, compared to just fifteen percent of women).  
 258. Id. at 8.  
 259. 842 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1992). 
 260. See id. at 1250 (emphasizing “the State’s ultimate responsibility for 
maintaining a nondiscriminatory common school system”).  
 261. See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 133, at 98–99 (noting that Butt 
reaffirmed Serrano and was decided well after Hardy).  
 262. See Butt, 842 P.2d at 1249 (noting that these greater rights stem from 
the “uniquely fundamental personal interest” in education that exists in 
California).  
 263. Id. (emphasis added).  
 264. See Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *7 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014) (claiming that the “substantial evidence” shown at trial 
“makes it clear” that the tenure provisions have a discriminatory effect on 
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Court of Appeal relied on a lack of causation, finding that any 
statistical evidence of ineffective teachers disproportionately 
working in minority schools was the result of school 
administrators’ decision-making, and not the tenure statutes.265 In 
future tenure challenges, the critical issue will be whether the 
court requires proof of discriminatory purpose. When state courts 
decide to follow Washington and require discriminatory intent, the 
disparate impact challenge to tenure will likely fail.266 
V. Framing the Ideal Legal Challenge to Teacher Tenure 
In framing the ideal challenge to teacher tenure, the initial 
hurdle plaintiffs face is deciding whether to bring the challenge 
under state or federal law.267 Using the three stages of school 
funding as a guide, the most effective arguments will be under 
state constitutional provisions.268 In large part, this is because the 
Supreme Court has blocked many of the legal paths that plaintiffs 
might take to sustain a tenure challenge under federal law.269 
Rodriguez denied education status as a fundamental right,270 
whereas Washington required proof of discriminatory purpose to 
show disparate impact.271  
                                                                                                     
minority students).  
 265. See Vergara v. State, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262, 286 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) 
(finding that the evidence at trial “firmly demonstrated that staffing decisions, 
including teacher assignments, are made by administrators”).  
 266. See, e.g., Kim v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 382, 382 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a workers’ 
compensation cap because of the absence of discriminatory purpose).  
 267. See supra Part II.A–B (discussing plaintiffs’ strategic decision to bring a 
funding suit under the U.S. Equal Protection Clause or state constitutional equal 
protection clauses).  
 268. See supra Part II.B–C (describing plaintiffs’ successes under state 
constitutional provisions).  
 269. See infra notes 270–271 and accompanying text (discussing how 
Rodriguez and Washington made it difficult for plaintiffs to bring tenure 
challenges under the U.S. Constitution).  
 270. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing the Rodriguez 
court’s reasoning for denying education classification as a fundamental right).  
 271. See supra note 247 and accompanying text (describing the Washington 
court’s requirement for showing discriminatory purpose).  
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State education clauses ultimately provide plaintiffs with the 
strongest arguments, regardless of whether plaintiffs formulate 
their claim as an equality challenge or an adequacy challenge. 
Under an equality argument, the education clause provides a 
direct textual basis for plaintiffs to assert that education is a 
fundamental right.272 As in Vergara, plaintiffs can argue under a 
state’s equal protection clause that strict scrutiny applies, leading 
to the invalidation of tenure laws.273 Under an adequacy argument, 
plaintiffs can use the heightened standard of quality set forth in 
the education clause to argue that the quality of education in 
public schools’ is constitutionally inadequate.274  
A. Demonstrating Causation 
Suggesting the ideal format for a tenure challenge first 
requires grappling with the chief criticism of the Vergara lawsuit—
that plaintiffs’ evidence is insufficient because it fails to prove a 
direct causal relationship between the tenure statutes and 
ineffective teachers.275 Demonstrating causation is necessary to a 
successful challenge regardless of whether the lawsuit is an equal 
protection claim or an adequacy claim.276 Judge Treu, possibly due 
to the brevity of his analysis, has been criticized for facially 
accepting plaintiffs’ arguments regarding causation without 
                                                                                                     
 272. See, e.g., Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1248–50 (1992) (explaining the 
constitutional demand of the education clause and how California courts’ judicial 
interpretation of the education clause has established education as a fundamental 
right in California).  
 273. See Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *2 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014) (describing the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim).  
 274. See supra Part II.C (discussing the adequacy arguments of the third 
stage of school funding litigation).  
 275. See Brief for Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine L. Fisk as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Appellants, Vergara v. State, No. B258589 (Cal. Ct. App. June 24, 
2015) [hereinafter Amicus Brief for Appellants] (criticizing Judge Treu’s opinion 
for his lack of analysis regarding the causal effect of the tenure statutes).   
 276. See, e.g., Butt, 842 P.2d at 1256 (upholding the trial court’s 
determination that a school district’s decision to cancel the last six weeks of school 
“would cause educational disruption sufficient to deprive District students of 
basic educational equality”); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 
186, 198 (Ky. 1989) (finding that in an adequacy funding challenge, plaintiffs 
“showed a definite correlation between the money spent per child on education 
and the quality of education received”).  
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providing a more thorough review of the evidence.277 Professor 
Black asserts that the Vergara challenge to tenure is meritorious 
enough to survive facial pleading stages, yet fails to reach the level 
of a constitutional violation because “the research certainly does 
not speak to whether tenure has a positive or negative effect on 
individual teachers.”278 As an amicus for the State on appeal, 
Professor Chemerinsky similarly contended that plaintiffs “failed 
to adequately demonstrate that the tenure, dismissal, and layoff 
statutes were the cause of any educational disparities.”279  
This Note urges a more realistic lens through which to view 
causation. The way in which courts must measure causation in the 
tenure context is fundamentally different from the way causation 
has been measured in school funding cases. 280 This difference is 
because of the qualitative nature of gauging teacher effectiveness, 
as opposed to the strictly quantitative measurement of school 
funding.281 Courts reviewing funding challenges can create side-
by-side numerical comparisons of a school district’s property 
values and corresponding tax rates.282 A court in a funding 
challenge therefore has a clear evidentiary basis to show how 
                                                                                                     
 277. See, e.g., Michael Hiltzik, Teacher Tenure Case: Another Sign the Judge’s 
Ruling Deserves an F, L.A. TIMES (June 12, 2014), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-teacher-tenure-trial-20140612-
column.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2016) (lambasting Judge Treu’s “single-
minded determination to blame the ills of the California educational system 
entirely on due-process protection for teachers”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 278. Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Challenge to Teacher Tenure, 104 
CAL. L. REV. 75, 129 (2016).  
 279. See Amicus Brief for Appellants, supra note 275, at 9–10 (alleging that 
Judge Treu’s entire finding of causation consisted of one “block quote” from the 
CDE Report).  
 280. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Cal. 1971) 
(calculating per-pupil expenditures across several school districts in Los Angeles 
County). For example, the court found that from 1968–1969, Baldwin Park 
Unified School District spent $577.49 per pupil, Pasadena Unified School District 
spent $840.19 per pupil, and Beverly Hills Unified School District expended 
$1,231.72 per pupil. Id.  
 281. Eric A. Hanushek, Teacher Quality, in TEACHER QUALITY 3 (Lance T. 
Izumi et. al. eds., 2002) (observing a wide range of differences exist among 
teachers and that “these differences are not captured by common measures of 
teachers (qualifications, experience, and the like)”).  
 282. See id. at 1252 n.15 (creating a table comparing school spending rates 
with tax rates across twelve different school districts).  
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property tax formulas cause significant disparities in per-pupil 
funding among school districts.283 Teacher effectiveness, due to its 
qualitative nature, cannot be as readily subjected to such direct 
quantification.284  
To demonstrate the difficulty of proving the same degree of 
causation as the funding cases, it is helpful to hypothetically 
conceive of what the ideal data set would look like in the tenure 
context. For example, to show the quantitative effect of the 
dismissal provision, school administrators would need to keep a 
running tally of each time they would have fired a teacher for 
unsatisfactory performance but refrained from doing so due to the 
dismissal provision’s complexity and cost. Similarly, principals 
would need to document each time they laid off a more effective 
junior teacher due to the requirements of the LIFO provision.  
In petitioning the Supreme Court of California for review, the 
Vergara plaintiffs noted the need for a similar lens through which 
to view causation.285 Citing Supreme Court of California 
precedent, the Vergara plaintiffs argued that “a court may not 
overlook the probable impact of a law when analyzing its 
constitutionality.”286 Courts should take into account “the realities 
of the world in which those laws operate,” and recognize that, 
because of their proximity to the classroom, school principals and 
administrators represent the strongest source of evidence as to the 
effects of California’s teacher tenure laws.287 When, as in Vergara, 
the evidence presented shows that the effects of tenure laws 
impose systematic and appreciable harm upon students’ learning 
opportunities, courts should find requisite causation to establish a 
constitutional violation.  
                                                                                                     
 283. See id. at 1247–48 (stating that the source of funding disparities between 
school districts is “unmistakable” in justifying the invalidation of the property tax 
funding scheme).  
 284. See id. at 11 (concluding that “teacher quality cannot be readily linked 
to teacher characteristics”).  
 285. See Petition for Review at 19–21, Vergara v. State, No. B258589 (Cal. 
Sup. Ct. May 24, 2016) [hereinafter Petition for Review] (emphasizing the need 
to examine the statutes’ disparate impact “in light of the real-world conditions in 
which these statutes operate”). 
 286. Id. at 20 (quoting Parr v. Mun. Court, 479 P.2d 353, 356 (Cal. 1971)).  
 287. See infra notes 288–298 and accompanying text (reviewing the 
substantial evidence presented at trial from school administrators and 
principals).  
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At trial, both the State and the Vergara plaintiffs produced 
school administrators who testified as to the tenure provisions’ 
systematic and harmful effects on students throughout 
California.288 With regards to the permanence statute, various 
California administrators, as well as former LAUSD 
Superintendent John Deasy, all testified that the 16-month 
probationary period before awarding tenure was far too brief.289 
The State’s witness, Dr. David Berliner, similarly testified that a 
three to five year probationary period would be preferable.290  
The evidence produced at trial regarding the effects of the 
dismissal statutes was even more startling. Plaintiffs produced 
testimony from the former chief human resources officer for 
LAUSD, who testified that she was not aware of any performance-
based dismissal proceeding that finished in less than two years.291 
Multiple school principals stated that the costs of initiating 
dismissal proceedings ranged from $50,000–$450,000.292 
Witnesses from both sides agreed that the net result of the time 
and cost of dismissing a teacher is such that administrators rarely 
elect to initiate dismissal proceedings.293 The statistics bear this 
assertion out. Between 2003 and 2013, only twenty-two teachers 
in the entire state of California were dismissed for unsatisfactory 
performance.294 This represents “only 0.0008% of the nearly 
300,000 teachers” working across the state.295 As to the LIFO 
provision, plaintiffs presented significant evidence regarding the 
                                                                                                     
 288. See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 133, at 35 (describing testimony of 
State witnesses who agreed that the complexity of the dismissal provision causes 
administrators to view the chances of dismissing a tenured teacher as 
“impossible”).  
 289. See id. at 26 (finding that this time period was too short of a time period 
to properly evaluate a teacher’s skill).  
 290. See id. at 27 (acknowledging that this lengthened probationary period 
would benefit both students and teachers).  
 291. See id. at 31–32 (noting further that the State did not produce evidence 
of one single “CPC hearing that took less than 2 years”).  
 292. See id. (noting that the State did not produce evidence of even one CPC 
dismissal case that had a cost outside of this range).   
 293. See id. (quoting plaintiffs’ witness Ms. Larissa Adam, a principal from 
Oakland Unified School District, who testified that “[she] viewed [dismissal] as 
not a realistic option”).  
 294. See id. at 3 (explaining that this means “only 2.2 teachers are dismissed 
on average, each year, for unsatisfactory performance”).  
 295. Id.  
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harms of a seniority-based layoff system.296 Plaintiffs cited a study 
conducted by Dr. Goldhaber, which analyzed thousands of teacher 
layoff notices from LIFO districts.297 At trial, Dr. Goldhaber 
concluded from his study that only 16% of teachers who were laid 
off due to seniority would have been laid off had teacher 
effectiveness been the main criteria.298 
Causation is often viewed solely as a question of creation—do 
the tenure provisions create ineffective teachers?299 Courts 
reviewing causation in tenure challenges should instead “consider 
the circumstances in the light of existing conditions.”300 
California’s tenure laws effectuate blind retention—no matter 
what force prompted a teacher to be ineffective, all grossly 
ineffective teachers share in the ironclad job protections that 
tenure provisions afford.301 California’s tenure provisions cause 
ineffective teaching because they do not provide administrators 
with the flexibility to dismiss grossly ineffective teachers.302 
Absent the argument that no grossly ineffective teachers exist in 
California, the tenure provisions necessarily retain the 
employment of teachers who impair California students’ 
educational opportunities.303  
                                                                                                     
 296. See id. at 39–40 (presenting testimony from Dr. Chetty, who claimed that 
“48 percent of LAUSD teachers who are laid off under a seniority-based layoff 
system are actually more effective than the average LAUSD teacher”).  
 297. See id. at 39 (referencing Dr. Goldhaber’s study as proof that the harms 
caused by the LIFO statute are “significant and measurable”).  
 298.  See id. at 39 (arguing that this estimate means that “84 percent of 
teachers laid off under a seniority-based system are more effective than all the 
teachers who would be laid off under an effectiveness-based layoff system”).  
 299. See Black, supra note 278, at 119 (listing potential causes of inadequate 
teaching as “poor leadership at the local level, poor professional development, 
overcrowded classrooms, or insufficient funds”). 
 300. In re Smith, 143 Cal. 368, 372 (1904).  
 301. See TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 11 (2010), 
http://relwest-
archive.wested.org/system/event_attachments/93/attachments/original/Teacher_
Effectiveness_Task_Force_Report__vfinal__0.pdf [hereinafter TASK FORCE 
REPORT] (observing that many view tenure as an “ironclad guarantee” and that 
“the framework for teacher tenure decisions should be about growth . . . not about 
protection from . . . dismissal”).  
 302. See id. (noting that fewer than 1% of tenured teachers get fired).  
 303. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing testimony from a 
State’s witness that anywhere from 1–3% of California teachers are “grossly 
ineffective”).  
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The nature of plaintiffs’ evidence at trial should also not be 
characterized as anecdotal.304 Much of the public rebuke to 
California’s tenure laws does come in the form of cautionary tales 
of specific teachers who egregiously personify the harms of rigid 
tenure.305 At trial, however, most evidence presented came from 
school administrators who cope with the constraints of the tenure 
provisions on a yearly basis.306 School administrators conduct 
evaluations and review the test score results of their teacher 
employees.307 Because of the qualitative nature of teacher 
effectiveness, and because administrators are most qualified to 
present findings on the actual effects of the tenure provisions, 
courts reviewing tenure challenges similar to Vergara should treat 
this evidence as sufficient to show a “real and appreciable impact” 
on students’ right to education.  
B. Equality or Adequacy: Which Legal Theory? 
Due to the weaknesses inherent in equality challenges to 
teacher tenure, adequacy theory represents the strongest 
formulation for a tenure challenge. Exposing some of these 
weaknesses, the California Court of Appeal overturned the trial 
court in Vergara, finding that for equal protection purposes, 
students assigned to grossly ineffective teachers were not a 
sufficiently identifiable class.308 In their petition to the Supreme 
Court of California, plaintiffs argued that the appellate court erred 
by conflating the requirements for equal protection and 
substantive due process arguments.309 Regardless of which 
                                                                                                     
 304. See Black, supra note 278, at 130 (noting the “reports and anecdotal 
stories” that simply assert a causal connection between the tenure laws and 
ineffective teaching).  
 305. See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 157 (using stories of particular teachers to 
demonstrate the harmful effects of California’s tenure provisions).  
 306. See supra notes 288–298 and accompanying text (describing the evidence 
that various school district administrators presented at trial).  
 307. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 301, at 9 (explaining that in LAUSD, 
principals conduct “STULL” evaluations which are based on the California 
Standards for the Teaching Profession).  
 308. See Vergara v. State, 202 Cal. Rptr. 3d 262, 283–84 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) 
(noting that plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy this threshold requirement precluded the 
court from reaching fundamental rights analysis).  
 309. See Petition for Review, supra note 285, at 5 (“The Court of Appeal’s 
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standard is correct under California law, an adequacy challenge to 
tenure would avoid such interpretive difficulties.310  
An adequacy challenge requires no classification of education 
as a fundamental right. An adequacy challenge also does not 
require plaintiffs to allege that the tenure provisions 
impermissibly discriminate against a suspect class. Adequacy 
arguments are conceptually simpler for courts to interpret—an 
adequacy challenge only asks courts to interpret the education 
clause found in the state constitution.311 Because it is well within 
the confines of the judiciary’s authority to interpret and give 
meaning to state constitutions, state courts are more willing to 
assume an activist role while reviewing adequacy challenges.312  
The Washington Supreme Court’s recent decision in McCleary 
v. State313 demonstrates the lengths to which a state court may be 
willing to go when asked to give meaning to a state education 
clause. Plaintiffs in McCleary brought an adequacy funding 
challenge, asserting that the quality of Washington schools was 
insufficient in light of the state’s “affirmative paramount duty” to 
provide for education.314 The court in McCleary classified 
education as a positive right; unlike traditional negative rights 
that restrain government action, positive rights obligate the 
government to provide some level of services.315 Because of the 
state’s affirmative constitutional obligation to provide for 
education, the court determined that traditional deference to the 
                                                                                                     
holding conflates fundamental rights claims with suspect-classification claims.”). 
 310. See McUsic, supra note 77, at 312–15 (discussing the difficulties 
plaintiffs face when bringing equal protection claims).   
 311. See Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1025 (Colo. 1982) 
(“Thus, whether a better financing system could be devised is not material to this 
decision, as our sole function is to rule on the constitutionality of our state’s 
system.”).  
 312. See, e.g., Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1220 (Kan. 2014) (“Like the 
Texas Supreme Court’s relationship to its state constitution, the Kansas Supreme 
Court is the final authority to determine adherence to the Kansas Constitution.”).   
 313. 269 P.3d 227 (Wash. 2012).  
 314. Id. at 247.  
 315. See id. at 248 (observing that the “distinction between positive and 
negative constitutional rights is important because it informs the proper 
orientation for determining whether the State has complied” with its duty to 
provide education).  
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legislature was the “wrong lens” through which to review the 
funding system’s constitutionality.316  
Instead of reviewing the funding system with a presumption 
of constitutionality, the court in McCleary based constitutionality 
on “whether the funding system has met, or is reasonably likely to 
meet, its constitutionally prescribed goals.”317 The Washington 
Supreme Court found the current funding scheme was insufficient 
given the state’s obligation to amply provide for the education of 
all children.318 Dissatisfied with over thirty years of perceived 
legislative stagnation, the court decided to retain jurisdiction over 
the case to monitor legislative compliance.319 Finding that the 
legislature had not remedied the constitutional violation, the court 
recently issued financial sanctions of $100,000 per day until the 
funding system reaches compliance.320  
The McCleary decision is the extreme example of judicial 
activism in the adequacy context—by rejecting traditional 
deference to the legislature and by fashioning a more activist 
standard of review, the Washington Supreme Court likely 
overstepped its judicial authority under separation of powers 
principles.321 Whether the level of activism as seen in McCleary is 
constitutional is beyond the scope of this Note. In the context of 
challenges to teacher tenure, the greater point is that courts will 
be more willing to wade into the political thicket when asked to 
give substantive meaning to education clauses.322  
Even state courts that defer to the legislature’s decisions in 
education policy-making and funding will often find that the 
                                                                                                     
 316. Id.  
 317. See id. (referring to this level of inquiry as a “delicate exercise in 
constitutional interpretation”).  
 318. Id. at 253.  
 319. See id. at 259 (“What we have learned from experience is that this court 
cannot stand on the sidelines and hope the State meets its constitutional mandate 
to amply fund education.”). 
 320. See Order of Aug. 13, 2015 at 9, McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227 (Wash. 
2012) (No. 84362-7) (“Effective immediately, the State of Washington is assessed 
a remedial penalty of $100,000 per day until it adopts a complete plan for 
complying with article IX, section 1.”). 
 321. See Island Cty. v. State, 955 P.2d 377, 380 (Wash. 1998) (noting that 
Washington state courts deferentially review statutes out of respect for 
separation of powers principles).  
 322. See supra notes 313–321 (discussing McCleary v. State). 
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education clause provides some minimum quality of educational 
opportunity.323 The key to an adequacy challenge to teacher tenure 
will be connecting tenure provisions with constitutionally 
inadequate educational opportunities.324 Demonstrating such a 
link brings up a common definitional problem in adequacy 
challenges. For as long as plaintiffs have brought adequacy 
challenges to education policy, state courts have struggled with 
defining what exactly constitutes a constitutionally adequate 
education.325  
Considerable debate exists as to what inputs best produce 
superior educational opportunities—the bulk of education reform 
litigation in the past fifty years has centered on funding, while 
tenure challenges like Vergara base their claims on teacher 
effectiveness.326 Funding challenges have struggled with 
identifying a constitutionally adequate level of funding: How much 
funding do schools need to give students adequate educational 
opportunities?327 Adequacy challenges to tenure could similarly 
suffer in attempting to answer critics who ask: What percentage of 
teachers within a district must be “effective” to fend off a 
constitutional violation? 
Yet, here is where tenure suits like Vergara would have a 
distinct advantage in the adequacy context. Whereas plaintiffs and 
school districts vigorously dispute the correlative relationship 
                                                                                                     
 323. See, e.g., Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 
206, 227 (Conn. 2010) (holding that the fundamental right to education under 
Connecticut’s education clause “encompasses a minimum qualitative standard 
that guarantees students the right to suitable educational opportunities” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 324. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 804 N.W.2d 618, 638–39 (S.D. 2011) (rejecting 
plaintiff’s funding adequacy claim because, “even assuming the deficiencies, the 
weakest link in plaintiff’s constitutional challenge is tying the funding to the 
results”).  
 325. See, e.g., Lobato v. State, 304 P.3d 1132, 1139 (Colo. 2013) (defining a 
constitutionally adequate education by using Webster’s dictionary to interpret a 
“thorough and uniform education” as one marked by “completeness, is 
comprehensive, and is consistent across the state”).  
 326. See supra Part IV (discussing the legal arguments of the Vergara 
lawsuit).  
 327. See Morath v. Texas Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., No. 14–0776, 
2016 WL 2853868, at *17 (Tex. Sup. Ct. May 13, 2016) (finding that to achieve 
the constitutional threshold of an adequate education, “a court must not only find 
that a cost-quality relationship exists, but also must assign specific quantitative 
measures to that relationship”). 
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between more funding and superior educational outcomes, both 
sides agree that effective teachers are essential to students’ 
educational growth.328 There are not many in the education world 
who would dispute that good teachers are essential to opening 
educational opportunities for their students. In contrast, the main 
criticism of funding claims is that more funding does not 
necessarily lead to better educational opportunities.329 
Plaintiffs bringing tenure challenges should formulate them 
as adequacy challenges, and they should further tether teacher 
effectiveness to the promise of educational opportunity contained 
in each state’s education clause. Good teachers create educational 
opportunities, while grossly ineffective teachers foreclose them.330 
In California, tenure laws give a teacher permanent employment 
before adequate time has passed to diagnose that teacher’s skill 
level.331 When administrators find that a teacher is grossly 
ineffective, the tenure laws make dismissal of that teacher an 
unrealistic option.332 The net result is that many California 
students receive a quality of education that does not carry with it 
the educational opportunities envisioned by the California 
constitution’s education clause. If plaintiffs can convince courts 
that this harm is systematic and substantial across the entire 
state, then plaintiffs will have set forth a colorable adequacy 
challenge to teacher tenure laws. 
Refashioning the complaint in Vergara highlights the 
advantages that adequacy theory has in the tenure context. Using 
precedent emphasizing the “indispensable role” of education in 
California, plaintiffs could have argued that California’s education 
                                                                                                     
 328. See Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *3 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014) (citing the State defendants’ exhibit 1005 that declared 
“a growing body of research confirms that the quality of teaching is what matters 
most for students’ development and learning in schools”).  
 329. See Eric A. Hanushek, The Economics of Schooling: Production and 
Efficiency in Public Schools, 24 J. ECON. LIT. 1141, 1167 (1986) (concluding that 
the schools are run in an economically inefficient manner, and that “increased 
expenditures by themselves offer no overall promise for improving education”).  
 330. See supra note 17 (describing several studies that have found teacher 
effectiveness to be the most important factor behind generating better student 
outcomes).  
 331. See supra Part III.A (detailing the California permanence provisions). 
 332. See supra Part III.B (discussing how the dismissal statutes significantly 
impair school administrators’ ability to dismiss grossly ineffective teachers).  
1652 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1601 (2016) 
clause imposes a heightened definition of a constitutionally 
adequate education.333 Plaintiffs’ evidentiary strategy would still 
be the same—first quantifying the impact of a grossly ineffective 
teacher and then demonstrating how tenure statutes permanently 
employ these teachers would illustrate to a reviewing court the 
inadequacy of the current tenure system.334 Because this argument 
singularly targets the language of the education clause, a 
reviewing court could focus on the existing inadequacies caused by 
the current tenure system, as opposed to being distracted by the 
numerous threshold requirements and spillover consequences of 
finding an equal protection violation. 
VI. Conclusion 
The growing consensus regarding the importance of teacher 
effectiveness to a students’ educational growth has made legal 
challenges to teacher tenure more viable than ever. Plaintiffs in 
other states who decide to challenge tenure laws will face the 
strong inclination to adopt Vergara’s dual equal protection 
theories.335 Adequacy theory, however, holds greater promise for 
plaintiffs seeking tenure reform. Plaintiffs can focus on the gross 
inadequacy of teachers within their school district to contend that 
their educational quality does not meet the adequacy standard set 
forth in the education clause. Despite Vergara’s ultimate failure 
within the California court system, the trial court’s ruling in 
Vergara has signaled that courts may be willing to give state 
education clauses greater teeth.336 Adequacy theory will allow 
plaintiffs the greatest opportunity to test this hypothesis by 
                                                                                                     
 333. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1255 (Cal. 1971). 
 334. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 198 
(recognizing the testimony given by numerous educational experts at trial as to 
the effects funding disparities have on students’ educational opportunities). 
 335. See Black, supra note 278, at 123–24 (discussing the factual allegations 
of the New York plaintiffs). 
 336. See Valerie Strauss, A Silver Lining in the Vergara Decision?, WASH. 
POST (June 11, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-
sheet/wp/2014/06/11/a-silver-lining-in-the-vergara-decision/ (last visited Sept. 30, 
2016) (explaining that the Vergara decision could cast California courts as “a 
guarantor of educational equality”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
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prompting plaintiffs to argue for a heightened standard of 
educational quality.  
Growing roses in concrete is a difficult feat. The issue that 
Vergara and decades worth of school-funding litigation have 
sought to address is identifying the force that can create cracks in 
the concrete wide enough to permit roses to grow. One of the more 
intractable problems in addressing educational inequality is that 
there exist so many differing explanations as to why certain 
students lag behind.337 Vergara is groundbreaking because it 
seizes on teacher effectiveness as the variable with the greatest 
potential effect on a child’s educational growth. The challenge to 
teacher tenure in Vergara is a valuable start—reducing barriers to 
eliminating the most harmful subset of ineffective teachers can 
only help student achievement.  
Down the line, however, education reformers must place 
greater emphasis on teacher evaluation. If teacher effectiveness 
truly is the most significant factor affecting student achievement, 
why are most LAUSD teachers observed by their superiors only 
once a year?338 Increasing the probationary period before awarding 
tenure is logical, but only if teachers are more frequently observed 
and evaluated during that time period. Since No Child Left 
Behind,339 school administrators consistently fall into the trap of 
equating teacher effectiveness with students’ standardized test 
scores.340 While scores are certainly relevant, employment 
decisions driven by scores as the sole criterion ignore the fact that 
effective teaching encompasses many other intangible traits. An 
effective teacher has high levels of student engagement in class 
and is able to create a classroom culture that is conducive to every 
                                                                                                     
 337. See Identifying Factors that Contribute to Achievement Gaps, NAT’L 
EDUC. ASS’N, http://www.nea.org/home/17413.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2016) 
(dividing a list of several causes of the American achievement gap by those factors 
that are within schools’ control and those that are outside schools’ control) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 338. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 301, at 9 (“Teachers are evaluated 
the first year they become permanent, and at least every other year thereafter.”).  
 339. The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2002).  
 340. See Eric A. Hanushek & Steven G. Rivkin, The Quality and Distribution 
of Teachers Under the No Child Left Behind Act, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 134 
(2010) (noting that under No Child Left Behind, schools hoping to remain in “good 
standing” must meet benchmarks based on students’ standardized test pass 
rates).  
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child’s learning abilities. These two intangible qualities of teacher 
effectiveness can only be measured by in-class observation and 
evaluation.  
Vergara challenged legal impediments to removing those 
teachers already identified as grossly ineffective. These teachers, 
due to their inability to teach at the most basic level, hamper the 
educational opportunities of the students in their classrooms. To 
really have a transformative effect on student achievement, 
however, it is not enough to simply root out the worst teachers. 
School districts and administrators must concentrate greater 
effort and resources on cultivating the teacher talent already 
within. The status quo, with infrequent observation and one data 
set of test scores per year, does not achieve this goal.341 Without 
more effective teacher evaluation, Vergara’s goal to address 
disparities in teacher effectiveness will not be met, regardless of 
the length of the tenure probationary period or the complexity of 
the dismissal procedures. 
                                                                                                     
 341. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 307, at 11 (observing that 99.3% of 
teachers in LAUSD receive a “Meets Standard Performance” rating on their 
evaluation).  
